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Preface
The thesis provides three essays on prices versus quantities in environmental pol-
icy – a leading topic in current environmental economics research. There is broad
consensus in the community of academic economists that market-based instruments
are superior in regulating harmful emissions. Therefore, the thesis focuses on the
choice between a tax (price instrument) and a system of tradeable permits (quantity
instrument).
Recently, policy instrument choice has gained particular attention in the context of
climate change. Policy designs for greenhouse gas mitigation increasingly envisage
market-based instruments. The most prominent example is the climate policy imple-
mented by the European Union, which uses an emissions trading system to regulate
greenhouse gases (EU ETS). By contrast, the Swiss Confederation implemented a
mixed policy with a tax on carbon dioxide emissions and an emissions trading sys-
tem at the same time, and it is left to the regulated firms to choose between these
instruments.
Limited information of economic agents makes the choice between a tax and trade-
able permits very important. In particular, uncertainty and asymmetric information
impede first-best outcomes and induce diverging welfare losses under the instru-
ments. An in-depth knowledge of the impacts of the policy instruments and their
(perhaps superior) hybrid forms – static and dynamic as well as theoretical and
empirical – is crucial to policy makers. This thesis contributes to enhancing this
knowledge.
Existing research on prices vs. quantities in environmental regulation provides a
solid foundation of analytical work on the performance of various regime designs
(static and dynamic), which takes into account various sets of market imperfections
(e.g. uncertainty) and incorporates the specific attributes of different pollutants
(e.g. stock vs. flow pollutants). This thesis focuses on the aspects of this body
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of research that draw a good picture of the conditions observed in practice, that
are widely accepted and recommended by environmental economists, and that are
highly relevant for policy makers. First of all, market-based instruments – and
specifically a tax and a system of tradeable permits – are considered. It is well
known that incentive-based instruments are superior in terms of cost effectiveness.
Second, uncertainty and asymmetric information are taken into account. These
market imperfections are persistent issues in practice and should not be neglected
when deriving normative prescriptions. Third, normative analysis is accompanied
by positive analysis ; theoretical results are verified by empirical evidence. Finally,
carbon dioxide emissions are considered in empirical analysis, a pollutant to which
particular attention has been devoted since the disclosure of anthropogenic climate
change.
Differences in the performance between a price and a quantity instrument in en-
vironmental regulation are essentially attributable to three market characteristics
that we can observe in practice: (1) Firms are different (firm heterogeneity); (2)
they are exposed to uncertainty in many respects; and (3) they are usually bet-
ter informed about their business than the regulatory authority (i.e. we observe
information asymmetry).
With uniformity of firms and perfect information, instrument choice concerns would
not arise: Under such circumstances, all firms exhibit equal costs in abating their
emissions and the regulatory authority sets a policy in a way that every firm inter-
nalizes its external costs. Thereby, the costs for the society (i.e. firms’ compliance
costs plus environmental damages) are minimized. The cost-efficient outcome can
equivalently be achieved by an emissions tax, an emissions subsidy, a system of trad-
able permits or a performance standard. However, in practice, we do not observe
these ideal conditions.
Relaxing the homogeneity assumption, the regulator does best by specifying a
market-price (tax) or the quantity (cap) for emissions, while market forces ensure
cost effectiveness, i.e. marginal abatement costs are the same for all firms. Both
instruments, the emissions tax and the system of tradeable permits, lead to an
equivalent amount of emissions, to equal emission prices and to equal costs for the
society.
The debate on instrument choice in environmental regulation gained particular at-
tention with the seminal paper “Prices vs. Quantities” by Weitzman (1974), pub-
lished in The Review of Economic Studies. Given uncertainty in abatement costs, he
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derived a formal criterion for the choice between a single-tax and a single-standard
regime. It is reasonable to assume abatement cost uncertainty as, for example, fac-
tor prices and output demand are subject to (substantial) fluctuations in practice.
While Weitzman’s criterion is based on homogeneous firms, Williams (2002) derives
the criterion by allowing for heterogeneity, thereby reducing the set of recommended
instruments to a tax and permit trading (benefits of emission trading compared to a
uniform standard arise from differences in firms’ marginal abatement costs). While
uncertainty drives expected damages under a tax (the emissions quantity adjusts ex
post to the ex ante fixed price), it drives expected compliance costs under a system
of tradeable permits (the permit price adjusts ex post to the ex ante fixed quantity).
A tax is therefore the preferred instrument when marginal damages are flat relative
to the industry’s marginal abatement costs. Otherwise, an emissions trading scheme
leads to lower expected social costs.
As an alternative to a single instrument regime, the regulatory authority can even
use the flexibility of both instruments by regulating one part of the market with a
tax, while the other part is regulated with emissions trading. Such a mixed policy is
proposed by Mandell (2008). He shows that using both instruments simultaneously
reduces expected social costs compared to a single tax and single permit trading.
But, information on firms’ abatement cost structure is required to optimally assign
firms to the instruments. Although both the regulator and the firms face uncertainty
in practice, firms are better informed about their actual costs to comply with the
policy. Firms do not have an incentive to report this private information, so there
is asymmetric information.
Uncertainty and imperfect information are important considerations in environmen-
tal regulation in practice, and both are concerns that have not yet received consid-
eration – in combination – in the theoretical research on instrument choice between
a tax and tradeable permits. The essay “Environmental Policy à la Carte: Letting
Firms Choose their Regulation” fills this gap in the theoretical literature. An in-
novative approach is presented, in which the regulator implements a policy menu
that consists of an emissions tax and a system of tradeable permits among which
firms choose their preferred instruments. It is shown that it is welfare improving to
delegate instrument choice to those agents that are better informed. By anticipat-
ing firms’ instrument choices, the regulatory authority designs the policy in a way
such that firms have an incentive to choose the instrument that is optimal from a
social perspective. With this Policy à la Carte, the same expected social costs as
Mandell (2008) can be attained. Thus, by letting firms choose the instrument, the
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asymmetric information problem can be overcome.
Besides static efficiency criteria, environmental policies should be evaluated in terms
of the incentives they provide to promote technical change, i.e. in enhancing dy-
namic efficiency. Under a standard, firms do not have an incentive to overcomply
with their target. Under a tax or permit trading, firms have a continuing incentive
to reduce their emissions when the market provides worthwhile technological solu-
tions that reduce the costs firms incur in complying with the policy. Environmental
economics literature provides a variety of theoretical rankings for the most impor-
tant environmental policy instruments in encouraging firms to adopt an advanced
abatement technology. Examples of such studies are those by Milliman and Prince
(1989), Jung et al. (1996), and Requate and Unold (2003). In the theoretical lit-
erature, emission taxes are typically the preferred alternative to free permits. An
advanced abatement technology lowers firms’ marginal abatement costs, leading to
a lower market price for permits and, in turn, to lower incentives to adopt the new
technology under free permits.
There is a comprehensive theoretical literature on prices vs. quantities in envi-
ronmental policy. However, implementing environmental policy requires empirical
studies to verify whether the instruments have the intended effects in practice and
whether economic agents behave as suggested by the theory. Unfortunately, empir-
ical studies in this research context are rare, first and foremost due to data limi-
tations. Ideally, empirical analysis refers to an economy with at least two policy
instruments implemented under similar economic conditions. Such a policy frame-
work is typically not implemented in practice. But, the exceptional nature of the
greenhouse gas mitigation strategies implemented in Switzerland by January 2008
offers an outstanding and worldwide unique policy framework to investigate research
questions in the context of prices vs. quantities in environmental regulation. The
Swiss Confederation offers firms a policy menu that consists of a tax and an emis-
sions trading scheme from which they can choose their preferred instrument. So, a
Policy à la Carte is implemented as theoretically analyzed in the first essay.
Swiss climate policy therefore provides an excellent opportunity to evaluate firms’
instrument preferences within the Policy à la Carte framework and to verify whether
firms behave as suggested by the theory. Furthermore, Swiss climate policy provides
ideal conditions for comparative analysis on the relative performance of an emissions
tax and a system of tradeable permits. First and foremost, the differential impacts
of the instruments in promoting technological change, is a field of empirical research
that is of particular interest for policy makers in designing current environmental
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policies and specifically in the context of fossile energy use and greenhouse gas
mitigation strategies.
The first empirical research question is addressed in the second essay “Prices vs.
Quantities: An Empirical Study of Firms’ Instrument Choices”. In applying the
specific design elements of Swiss climate policy, i.e. wage-based refunds of the tax
receipts for taxpaying firms and free permits with a permit allocation that is based
on historic emissions, a formal decision criterion for firms’ instrument choices is
derived. Theory identifies the driving forces for instrument choice as being permit
allocation, wages, uncertainty in abatement costs and the flexibility of firms’ abate-
ment technologies. Empirical evidence confirms the influence of the former two
aspects. By contrast, uncertainty and technological flexibility do not affect firms’
instrument preferences. Based on the empirical results, uncertainty is revealed as
not being crucial when firms chose the instrument themselves.
The second empirical research question is addressed in the last essay “Abatement
Technology Adoption under Different Policy Regimes: Some Empirical Evidence”
and is therefore the first study to provide insights into this topic. The analysis
compares investment expenditures under a tax regime with those under a permit
trading regime, thereby taking into account that there might be a self-selection bias
due to firms’ instrument choices. The result of the empirical analysis is unequiv-
ocal: Compared to a tax, free permits provide stronger incentives for technology
adoption, i.e. in enhancing dynamic efficiency, a result which is the exact opposite
of the traditional view in the theoretical literature brought forward, for example, by
Milliman and Prince (1989) and Jung et al. (1996).
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Executive Summary and
Principal Conclusions
In three essays, the debate on prices vs. quantities in environmental regulation is
addressed and further developed – theoretically and empirically. First, an environ-
mental “Policy à la Carte”, a regulation that simultaneously employs an emissions
tax and a system of tradeable permits among which firms can choose their pre-
ferred instrument, is theoretically analyzed. Second, the preferences of firms for the
instruments is empirically tested under this policy regime. Third, the differential
impacts of an emissions tax and permit trading on abatement technology adoption
is investigated empirically.
While the performances of single and hybrid instruments are well analyzed in the lit-
erature, a Policy à la Carte has not been investigated so far. The simultaneous use of
two market-based instruments with the instrument choice delegated to the regulated
firms makes this policy design special. The Swiss Confederation implemented such
a policy to mitigate carbon dioxide emissions. Under this design, firms can usually
choose between paying a tax on their carbon dioxide emissions and participating in
a system of tradeable permits. In the former case, they receive a wage-based refund
of the tax receipts; in the latter case, they receive free emission allowances based on
grandfathering.
The first essay “Environmental Policy à la Carte: Letting Firms Choose their Regula-
tion” analyzes the Policy à la Carte regime theoretically. The three key assumptions
are firm heterogeneity, uncertainty in marginal abatement costs, and information
asymmetry between the regulator and the firms regarding their abatement technolo-
gies. The regulator offers firms a policy menu that consists of a tax and tradeable
permits among which firms choose their preferred instrument. She anticipates that
firms choose the instrument under which they expect lower costs and sets the tax
rate and the cap accordingly. Furthermore, she grants a tax refund and/or auctions
7
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off parts of the permits. The latter two fine-tuning elements ensure that firms choose
the instruments that are optimal from a social point of view.
A single-instrument policy (single tax or single permit trading) fails to provide a first-
best outcome under uncertainty. The slope of the marginal abatement cost function
relative to the slope of the marginal damage function determines the preferability of
either instrument. Using both instruments simultaneously (mixed policy) reduces
the welfare loss that arises from uncertainty when firms are optimally assigned to
either the tax or permit trading. Therefore, the regulator requires information
on firms’ abatement technology. Firms do not have an incentive to report this
information. It is shown that the asymmetric information problem can be overcome
by delegating the prices-versus-quantities decision to firms. In this case, those agents
choose the instrument who are better informed, thereby signalling abatement cost
information to the regulator. Under limited information, a Policy à la Carte is then
not only preferable to an optimally designed single-instrument policy, but it performs
even as good as a mixed policy in which the regulator assigns the instruments to
firms when she knows the firms’ abatement technologies. Furthermore, even firms
benefit from the option of being able to choose between the instruments. Besides,
the policy is comparatively simple to implement.
The second and the third essay both provide empirical research on prices vs. quan-
tities in a way that has not been brought forward so far in the literature. Empirical
analysis is applied to an economy where both an emissions tax and permit trading
are implemented to regulate harmful emissions. So, instrument-related effects can
easily be determined. These unique and ideal conditions are currently provided by
Swiss climate policy. Therefore, data from Swiss manufacturing firms were collected.
Based on these data, the second essay “Prices vs. Quantities: An Empirical Study
of Firms’ Instrument Choices” investigates firms’ preferences between paying a tax
and participating in permit trading within the Swiss Policy à la Carte regime. Based
on the theoretical model of the first essay and by taking into account specific charac-
teristics of the Swiss policy, a formal decision criterion for firms’ instrument choices
is derived. The theory identifies the influential factors for instrument choice as be-
ing the potential allocation with free permits, the potential refund of tax receipts,
uncertainty in abatement costs, and the flexibility of firms’ abatement technologies.
Empirical evidence can be put forward with respect to the permit allocation and the
tax refund: The propensity to choose emissions trading rises with the allocation with
free permits, while firms’ prefer the tax, when they expect a high tax refund. Both
effects are statistically significant and robust. By contrast, uncertainty and flexibil-
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ity do not have an effect on instrument choice. This may be attributed the fact, that
Swiss firms are not only subject to price uncertainty in the permit trading regime,
but also in the tax regime. Based on national emission reduction achievements,
the tax rate may be increased in subsequent years. Thus, from a firm perspective,
uncertainty is not an issue in instrument choice.
Firms’ instrument choices are further driven by their abatement activities. This
may be attributable to the banking of permits beyond the Kyoto period. Alto-
gether, the empirical model has an outstanding high predictive power: Predicted
instrument choice corresponds to observed choice for 87.5 percent of the firms con-
sidered. Moreover, only little information is required about firms in order to predict
their preferences between a tax and permit trading correctly with a high degree of
probability.
In the last essay “Abatement Technology Adoption under Different Policy Regimes:
Some Empirical Evidence” empirical analysis focuses on the differential impacts
of an emissions tax and permit trading on the adoption of abatement technologies.
To analyze the research question, bivariate analysis is accompanied by multivariate
analysis. The outcome of interest is the intensities of investments in abatement
technologies of Swiss firms to indicate technology adoption. With the unique design
of Swiss climate policy, a binary variable could be constructed – indicating pol-
icy regime affiliation – in order to identify any instrument-related effects in firms’
adoption behavior.
In the bivariate analysis, significantly higher incentives to adopt advanced abate-
ment technologies can be observed for firms participating in emissions trading. In
the multivariate analysis, results are obtained from a three-pronged estimation pro-
cedure: (1) OLS model, (2) Tobit model, and (3) simultaneous Tobit-Probit model
with the third taking into account the possibility that there might be a self-selection
bias due to firms’ instrument choices. Furthermore, all three models are estimated
with the investment intensities modeled in levels as well as in logs. The multivariate
analysis yields a qualitatively robust effect: Compared to the tax, firms’ investments
in advanced abatement technologies are significantly higher under free permits. It
has to be noted, however, that the multivariate analysis suffers from small sample
size and crucial econometric model assumptions are violated.
From the bivariate and the multivariate analysis, the following general conclusion
can be drawn: Irrespective of the statistical method used to analyze the data, the
results indicate the superiority of free permits in providing incentives to adopt ad-
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vanced abatement technologies. This result is the direct opposite of the traditional
view in the theoretical literature according to which a tax would provide higher
incentives for technology adoption. Differences in the perceived stringency of the
instruments, uncertainty and transition effects of policy implementation may be
reasonable arguments for the observed effect. Despite statistical weaknesses, the
essay provides the first empirical study on the relative performance of a tax and free
permits in enhancing dynamic efficiency.
The thesis contributes to the environmental economics literature by providing an
innovative approach (Policy à la Carte) to regulate harmful emissions that takes
into account market imperfections that can be observed in practice (uncertainty
and asymmetric information). Moreover, empirical research in the context of the
prices-vs.-quantities debate is brought forward that could only be conducted due
to the unique design of Swiss climate policy. Under equal economic conditions, a
tax and a permit trading scheme are implemented at the same time. From this
research, valuable insights can be gained for policy makers by providing evidence
on how firms actually respond to environmental regulation in practice. Currently,
the Swiss policy framework offers outstanding conditions for empirical research on
prices vs. quantities. However, changes in legislation indicate that this may not last
forever.
Essay I
Environmental Policy à la Carte:
Letting Firms Choose their Regulation1
Frank C. Krysiak
University of Basel, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Environmental
Economics, Peter Merian-Weg 6, 4002 Basel, Switzerland, Frank.Krysiak@unibas.ch
Iris Maria Oberauner
University of Basel, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Environmental
Economics, Peter Merian-Weg 6, 4002 Basel, Switzerland, Iris.Oberauner@unibas.ch
Abstract
Under uncertainty, the optimal choice between price and quantity instruments de-
pends on the technology of the regulated firms, which is often private information.
We consider an environmental policy that delegates the prices-versus-quantities de-
cision to the firms by offering them the choice between an emissions tax and permit
trading. Such an approach is currently used in Swiss climate policy. We provide a
detailed characterization of the optimal policy and show that this approach reduces
expected social costs compared to a pure tax or permit-trading regime. We demon-
strate that an optimal allocation of firms to instruments can be achieved despite
substantial informational constraints, and that all firms gain from the introduction
of the instrument choice compared to optimally designed single-instrument policies.
Furthermore, we discuss the conditions under which this approach is likely to be
preferable to a hybrid regulation.
Keywords: Environmental Policy, Asymmetric Information, Screening, Uncer-
tainty, Prices-versus-Quantities
JEL classification: Q58, D82, H23, D81, Q54
1Published in the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 60 (2010) pp. 221–
232.
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I.1 Introduction
The literature on environmental policy design typically assumes that the policy
instrument faced by a firm is dictated by the regulator. The regulator levies a tax,
sets a standard, or implements a permit market, and the firms decide on production
and abatement under the incentives set by this policy.
This “top-down” type of policy performs well under perfect information. However,
whenever the policy is not continuously adjusted to cost shocks, it can implement
only a second-best allocation under information constraints like asymmetric infor-
mation or uncertainty (Weitzman, 1974). Welfare losses arise, because the policy
implements an ex-ante fixed quantity or price of emissions and thus almost surely
fails to equalize marginal abatement costs and marginal damage ex post.
Information constraints are ubiquitous in practice. In many cases, limited pre-
dictability of future factor and product prices results in uncertainty. Also, firms
usually have better knowledge about their abatement costs than a regulator, so that
there is asymmetric information with regard to the firms’ technologies.
Two classes of approaches have been developed that can eliminate or reduce the
accruing welfare losses. The first class comprises approaches where the policy is
adjusted to firm behavior, such as open market operations analyzed in Krysiak
(2008a) (which can combat uncertainty) or incentive schemes as shown by Collinge
and Bailey (1983) (which counter asymmetric information). These approaches re-
quire frequent and timely governmental action or rather complex policy designs and
are consequently rarely used in environmental policy. The second class relies on
approaches where the policy is fixed ex ante. These approaches are more easily
implementable but can only reduce, not eliminate, the welfare losses attributable to
information constraints. Among these are hybrid and mixed instruments. Hybrid
instruments, as proposed by Roberts and Spence (1976), alleviate welfare losses
by using differing instruments for different realizations of cost shocks. Mixed in-
struments, as shown by Mandell (2008), reduce welfare losses by using different
instruments for different firms. Both approaches focus on reducing the social costs
of uncertainty.
Instrument combinations build on the insight of Weitzman (1974) that, under un-
certainty, the optimal choice of a policy instrument depends on firms’ technologies.
If firms differ with regard to their technologies, it can be optimal to regulate them
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with different instruments. Depending on their technologies, firms are assigned to
a price-based instrument (tax) or a quantity-based instrument (permit trading).
This approach is of particular importance in climate policy, where many countries
regulate different sectors with different instruments.
In this paper, we take the approach of instrument combination a step further by
considering not only cost uncertainty and firm heterogeneity but also asymmetric
information with regard to the firms’ technologies. This is relevant in many appli-
cations, where the regulating authority does not have full information about each
firm’s technology. Without this information, the assignment of firms to instruments
cannot be made by the regulating authority.
To solve this problem, we decentralize the instrument choice. The idea is that
the power of market-based instruments compared to command-and-control policies
lies in granting the regulated firms the opportunity to choose their emissions, as
they have better information concerning their abatement costs. The regulating
authority only sets incentives for abatement. Under uncertainty, not only individual
abatement decisions but also the choice between price and quantity instruments
matters (Weitzman, 1974), and the optimal instrument choice depends on firm-
specific information (its technology). Thus it seems reasonable to grant firms the
right to choose not only their abatement efforts but also the instrument with which
they are regulated. The regulatory authority only sets incentives to assure that the
firms’ choices are socially optimal.
In our approach, the regulator offers firms a menu of policy instruments that consists
of permit trading and an emissions tax. Each firm chooses one of these instruments
and is then regulated for several periods with this instrument. To assure a socially
desirable allocation of firms to instruments, the regulator can fine-tune the policy
menu by auctioning some of the permits or by giving a lump-sum transfer (or a
partial tax exemption) to the tax-paying firms. The regulator does not know which
firm uses which technology, so that there is asymmetric information. Furthermore,
firms (as well as the regulator) do not have full information about their future
abatement costs when choosing a policy instrument (e.g., due to uncertain future
factor prices or uncertain future demand), so that there is also uncertainty.
This approach differs from previous incentives schemes, such as Collinge and Bailey
(1983), in that we consider both asymmetric information and uncertainty. In addi-
tion, we constrain our analysis to policies that do not need to be adjusted to cost
shocks. This rules out incentive schemes, such as the Vickrey auction considered in
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Collinge and Bailey (1983).2
There are three motivations for investigating the above regulatory setting. First,
we want to inquire whether the welfare gains characterized in Mandell (2008) can
be realized with less demanding information requirements, and thus for a broader
range of applications. Second, the question of whether instrument choice can be
delegated to the regulated firms is conceptually interesting. Finally, a self-selection
approach, similar to the one that we consider, has been recently implemented in
Switzerland, where firms can choose between paying a carbon tax or participating
in an emissions-trading scheme.3
We show that under uncertainty and asymmetric information, it is welfare improv-
ing to delegate instrument choice to regulated firms. An optimal self-selection of
firms can be achieved, and the menu from which the firms choose their preferred
instrument is fairly simple. Despite the asymmetric information, the same expected
social costs as in Mandell (2008) can be attained by the self-selection mechanism.
Furthermore, compared to a single-instrument design, all firms gain from the ability
to choose. We also show that a surprising result of Mandell (2008), that an optimal
policy mix always includes the tax but not always emissions trading, holds in a setup
with a more general form of firm heterogeneity. Finally, we compare our approach
to the hybrid regulation of Roberts and Spence (1976).
I.2 Review of the Literature
Our study is related to the screening literature, to the literature on incentive schemes
for pollution control, and to the prices-versus-quantities literature.
In the screening literature, a set of contract options is considered as a screening
device in markets with asymmetrically distributed information (Riley, 2001; Stiglitz,
1977). Insurance companies, for example, often offer a set of contracts from which
their clients choose according to their private information. The standard setting
results in a separating equilibrium when two groups of risk types are considered,
and markets are competitive. Thus private information can be revealed by self-
2Adjustments in the form of open market operations are necessary for using the Vickrey auction
in cases where costs change unexpectedly (Collinge and Bailey, 1983). In many applications, such
changes occur frequently, e.g., due to varying demand or volatile factor prices. Thus frequent
governmental action would be necessary to use this incentive scheme in such cases.
3A similar approach has also been used in the UK (Smith and Swierzbinski, 2007).
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selection.
In environmental economics, similar mechanisms have been analyzed. In a setup
with asymmetric information but no uncertainty, incentive schemes can be found
that render it optimal for firms to reveal private technological information (Collinge
and Bailey, 1983; Dasgupta et al., 1980; Kwerel, 1977; Spulber, 1988). However,
a regulation often has to be designed before actual costs are known and may not
be adjusted frequently in response to cost changes, because such adjustments are
subject to administrative delays, incur costs, and can induce inefficiencies due to
strategic firm behavior (Moledina et al., 2003). In such a setting, firms have only
a limited ability to reveal private information, as they do not have full information
themselves at the time when the policy is promulgated. Also, the incentives for
revealing information are changed, because firms know that the regulator cannot
optimally react to their actions. Thus, under uncertainty, rather complex incentive
schemes are necessary to elicit the private information necessary for an optimal
regulation.
A special case with uncertainty and asymmetric information is investigated in
Mentero (2000), where the optimal phase-in of a permit market is analyzed; some
firms are obliged to participate in permit trading while participation is voluntary for
others. An optimal opt-in rule is derived that allows information to be elicited from
the voluntarily participating firms. However, the assignment of firms among instru-
ments (compulsory and voluntary emissions trading) is given, whereas our focus is
to find the optimal distribution of firms among different instruments.
The prices-versus-quantities literature, initiated by Weitzman (1974), analyzes the
choice between a tax and a standard in a setting where the marginal abatement costs
of the regulated firms are uncertain at the time when the regulation is designed. If
the abatement cost function is strictly convex, expected abatement costs are lower
with a price instrument, as firms have the opportunity to adjust their abatement
efforts to the cost shocks. On the other hand, such adjustments induce varying
emissions, which increases the expected damage whenever the damage function is
strictly convex. Which of these effects dominates depends on the relative curvature
of the abatement cost and damage functions.
Several studies have advanced policy designs that can improve on a simple price or
quantity regulation. As shown by Roberts and Spence (1976), a hybrid regulation
that consists of a permit market together with a price floor (set by a subsidy) and a
price ceiling (set by a tax) can achieve a higher level of expected welfare than permit
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trading alone. Similar gains can be realized by issuing options for buying additional
permits (Unold and Requate, 2001), by renting permits at prices that increase with
the total number of permits (Collinge and Oates, 1982), or by adjusting the number
of permits on a permit market over time (Henry, 1989; Newell et al., 2005).4
Closest to our study is Mandell (2008) who analyzed the combined use of a permit
market and a tax. Firms have linear marginal abatement costs c′ = K + ε− ei/βi,
where ei denotes firm i’s emissions, and where ε is a common cost shock. Firms
are heterogeneous with regard to the curvature of their cost function (1/βi). The
regulator can observe the technology (the value of βi) of each firm.
The main results of Mandell (2008) are that is it is often optimal to use both
instruments simultaneously and that there is an asymmetry between them: It can
be optimal to use only an emissions tax, whereas it is never optimal to use only
permit trading.
The benefit of using two instruments simultaneously is that the difference between
marginal abatement costs and marginal damage due to the cost shock is reduced;
total emissions are closer to the ex-post efficient level than under a single instrument
policy (reduced volume error). However, this comes at the cost of the marginal
abatement costs of permit-trading firms (which vary with the cost shocks) differing
from those of tax-paying firms (which always equal the constant tax), whenever
a cost shock occurs. Therefore total abatement costs are not minimal (allocation
error). Whenever the reduction in the volume error outweighs the allocation error,
it is optimal to use both instruments.
The asymmetry arises because the reduction in the volume error due to using a
mixed instrument is larger when the marginal damage function is steep compared
to the marginal abatement cost function, in which case permit trading would be
the preferable policy in a single instrument regime. In this case, the volume error
reduction achieved by shifting a single firm to the tax always outweighs the increase
in the allocation error. So it is never optimal to have only permit-trading firms.
If the marginal damage function is relatively flat, in which case a tax would be
preferable in a single instrument design, the volume error reduction achievable by
using a mixed instrument can be outweighed by the increase in the allocation error.
Therefore it can be optimal to have only tax-paying firms.
4A detailed discussion of these mechanisms is provided in Krysiak (2008a).
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I.3 The Model
A fixed number of firms emit a homogenous and uniformly mixed pollutant, which
causes environmental damage. Firms can reduce their emissions by abatement.
There are different types of firms that use different technologies and thus have
different abatement cost functions. A regulator sets an environmental policy to
minimize expected social costs, which consist of the expected environmental damage
and the firms’ expected abatement costs.
The regulation is subject to information constraints. Future abatement costs are
subject to random influences, like changing factor prices, demand-side shocks, or
the breakdown of production equipment. This uncertainty exists both from the
regulator’s and from the firm’s perspective. In addition, there is asymmetric in-
formation. The regulator knows which technologies exist but does not know which
firms use which technology (Gottinger, 2001; Mentero, 2000). So, the regulator does
not know how much flexibility a given firm has in adjusting its abatement to cost
changes, which is the central technology parameter in the prices-versus-quantities
decision (Weitzman, 1974).
This informational asymmetry is typical for many environmental policy settings.
Often, some information on aggregate abatement costs exists owing to previous
regulation or to impact studies. But detailed, disaggregate information is missing
in many cases, such as the information as to how much flexibility a given firm has
in adjusting its abatement.
To overcome the informational asymmetry, we use a model setup and timing as
illustrated in Figure 1. In Step 1, the regulator offers the firms a choice between
paying a tax and participating in emissions trading. In Step 2, each firm has to
commit to one policy instrument for several periods before knowing its exact abate-
ment costs in these periods. Therefore, firms will choose according to their expected
costs. In each of the periods in Step 3, they observe their actual costs and optimize
their abatement under the instrument that they have chosen. We assume that the
realization of a firm’s abatement costs are intertemporally independent, so that it
suffices to consider only a representative period in Step 3.
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Figure I.1: The timing of decisions in our model.
To analyze this policy, we use the following variant of the prices-versus-quantities
model of Mandell (2008); Weitzman (1974); Williams III (2002). There is a contin-
uum of firms with mass one whose abatement cost functions can be approximated
by
C(a, β, θ) = (α + θ)a+
a2
2β
, (I.1)
where a denotes abatement, θ is a random influence, and α ≥ 0 and β > 0 describe
a firm’s technology.5 We assume that the random influences are firm-specific but
positively correlated among firms with a correlation coefficient ρ ∈ (0, 1]. Such
correlation is typical for many applications, as regulated firms are subject to the
same business cycles and similar movements of factor prices. For all firms, the
expected value of θ is zero, and we denote its variance by σ2 > 0.
The parameter α is identical for all firms but β varies among them (Mandell, 2008).6
We assume that the distribution of the parameter β has a differentiable density
φ(β) defined over β ∈ [0,∞) with φ(0) = 0 and limβ→∞ φ(∞) = 0. Thus only
perfectly flexible and fully inflexible technologies are excluded from our analysis per
se. Furthermore, the set of feasible technologies is connected, that is, if φ(β1) > 0
and φ(β2) > 0, then φ(β3) > 0, for all β3 ∈ [β1, β2]. This implies that if two
technologies are feasible, any combination of these technologies can be used as well.
We denote the expected value of β by βˆ.
Only the density function φ(β), the cost function (I.1), and the variance of θ are
known to the regulator. Our informational setup differs from that in Mandell (2008),
where the regulator knows which firm uses which technology and assigns firms to
5For notational simplicity, we use the reciprocal of the second derivative of C(a, β, θ) as a
technology parameter. Thus compared to the notation used in Weitzman (1974), we have C ′′ =
1/β.
6In many applications, firms’ abatement costs will differ with regard to both parameters. But
as we show in Section I.4, heterogeneity with regard to α does not change our results.
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an instrument based on this information. Also, in Mandell (2008), a uniform distri-
bution of β is used to model firm heterogeneity.
The emissions of a firm exerting abatement a are given by e(β) = e¯ − a(β), where
e¯ denotes a firm’s baseline emissions (i.e., firms’ emissions in the absence of regula-
tion).7 Total emissions are E =
∫∞
0
e(β)φ(β)dβ. The environmental damage caused
by pollution D(E) is approximated by a quadratic function
D(E) = γE +
E2
2δ
, (I.2)
where γ ≥ 0, δ > 0 are constant parameters. To assure that an intervention is
optimal at all and that it is not optimal to reduce total emissions to zero, we assume
γ ∈ (α− e¯/δ, α + e¯/βˆ).
The policy consists of three elements. First, the regulator grants zq permits free
of cost to each firm that participates in the emissions-trading scheme. Second, the
regulator sets an emissions tax pp. Granting some firms emission permits for free
while demanding that other firms pay an emissions tax for all of their emissions can
be seen as a lump-sum transfer to the permit-trading firms. Such a transfer would
set a strong incentive to choose permit trading. To correct this, the regulator uses
a third element, which can be either a partial auctioning of permits or a lump-sum
transfer to the tax-paying firms. For notational simplicity, we model a transfer to
the tax-paying firms as a (partial) tax exemption that is independent of a firm’s
actual emissions.8
The first two elements are standard. The third one serves to fine-tune a firm’s choice
between the policy instruments to assure that all firms choose the type of regulation
that is best from a social perspective.
7We assume that baseline emissions are deterministic, as we use an abatement cost function
that depends on abatement efforts. The marginal costs of reducing emissions below their baseline
value is randomly varying, but, without environmental policy, firms always choose a = 0, so that
this variation does not influence baseline emissions. In contrast, Mandell (2008) uses an abatement
cost function that depends on emissions, so that optimal emissions in the absence of environmental
policy are subject to random influences.
8Such an exemption is used, for example, in Swiss climate policy.
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I.4 The Optimal Policy
We analyze the problem via backward induction. Consider a firm of type β that
has opted to pay the emissions tax. In Step 3 this firm will minimize its total costs,
given the tax pp and the tax exemption zp:
min
a≥0
(α + θ)a+
a2
2β
+ pp (e¯− a− zp) . (I.3)
This results in emissions ep(β, θ) = e¯− β (pp − α− θ) and expected costs
E (Cp(β)) = pp (e¯+ αβ − zp)− β
2
(
p2p + α
2
)− β
2
σ2. (I.4)
As is apparent from Eq. (I.4), the firm benefits from the cost uncertainty. With
constant abatement, the firm’s expected costs would be independent of σ2, because
the cost function is linear in the random variable. By optimally adjusting its abate-
ment, the firm can improve upon this and thereby reduce its expected costs. The
more flexible is the firm’s technology (higher β), the stronger this effect becomes.
A firm participating in the emissions-trading scheme will minimize the costs
min
a≥0
(α + θ)a+
a2
2β
+ pq (e¯− a− zq) , (I.5)
where zq denotes the number of costlessly granted permits and where pq is the
endogenously determined market clearing price for permits. The optimal emissions
of such a firm are eq(β, θ) = e¯− β (pq − α− θ).
To determine the market clearing price for permits, we must first determine how
firms self-allocate to the instruments. From a social perspective, the permit market
should contain firms with a high β (and thus a low C ′′ in the notation of Weitzman
(1974)) rather than those with a low β, because firms with a more flexible technology
(high β) will adjust their output more strongly to cost shocks, which leads to higher
expected damage. However, as Eq. (I.4) shows, a firm gains more from the greater
abatement flexibility afforded by taxes if it has a more flexible technology. So with
regard to instrument choice, the firm-level incentives stand in direct opposition to
those of a social planner. Given that we investigate a self-selection mechanism, we
have to accept the sorting that corresponds to the firm-level incentives and search
for a policy menu that minimizes expected social costs under this restriction. This
allocation of firms to instruments is depicted in Figure 2.
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Figure I.2: The firms’ choice of instrument as a function of their technologies.
Assuming that the policy is set in a way that, for a given βcrit ≥ 0, all firms with
β ≤ βcrit participate in the emissions-trading scheme, and all firms with β > βcrit
choose to pay the tax, the market clearing condition can be written as∫ βcrit
0
(
eq(β, θ)− zq − zaucq
)
φ(β)dβ = 0, (I.6)
where zaucq denotes the number of auctioned permits per permit-trading firm. To
present the following analysis compactly, we define Eba (1) =
∫ b
a
φ(β)dβ and Eba (β) =∫ b
a
βφ(β)dβ. Thus Eβcrit0 (1) denotes the fraction of firms participating in permit
trading, whereas E∞βcrit (1) is the fraction of firms regulated by the tax. The quantities
Eβcrit0 (β) and E∞βcrit (β) help to characterize the average technology of the tax-paying
firms, which is E∞βcrit (β) /E∞βcrit (1), and the average technology of the permit-trading
firms, which is Eβcrit0 (β) /Eβcrit0 (1). Note that, by definition, E∞βcrit (1) and E∞βcrit (β)
are decreasing in βcrit.
With this notation, the market clearing price for emission permits is
pq = α +
(
e¯− zq − zaucq
) Eβcrit0 (1)
Eβcrit0 (β)
+ θpq , (I.7)
where θpq =
∫ βcrit
0
βθφ(β)dβ/Eβcrit0 (β) denotes the change of the permit price that is
induced by the varying demand for permits resulting from the individual cost changes
θ. Thus θpq captures the influence of the cost fluctuations on the market clearing
price for permits. Calculating θpq shows that we have E
(
θpq
)
= 0, E
(
θ2pq
)
= ρσ2,
and E (θpqθ) = ρσ2.
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With Eq. (I.7), the expected costs of a permit-trading firm are
E (Cq(β)) =α(e¯− zq) + (e¯− zq)
(
e¯− zq − zaucq
) Eβcrit0 (1)
Eβcrit0 (β)
(I.8)
− β
2
(
e¯− zq − zaucq
)2( Eβcrit0 (1)
Eβcrit0 (β)
)2
− β
2
(1− ρ)σ2.
Again, the firm benefits from the cost uncertainty (as can be seen from the last term
of Eq. (I.8)). However, the gain is smaller than under taxes, as there is a positive
correlation between a firm’s abatement costs and the permit price, which reduces
the firm’s adjustments.
Given the expected costs under both instruments, we can now analyze which firms
will choose which policy instrument. Comparing the expected costs under the tax
regime (Eq. (I.4)) and under the permit-trading scheme (Eq. (I.8)) shows that the
difference between these costs depends linearly on β. Thus, there can be at most
a single type of firm (i.e., a single value of β) for which the expected costs under
a tax equal those under permit trading. As in Figure 2, we denote the technology
parameter of this indifferent firm by βcrit.
To derive the optimal policy set, we also need information concerning the total
emissions and the resulting damage. Total emissions are
E = e¯E∞βcrit (1)− (pp − α)E∞βcrit (β) + (zq + zaucq )Eβcrit0 (1) + θE, (I.9)
where θE denotes the random variation of total emissions that is due to the random
cost changes. Calculating θE shows that E (θE) = 0 and E (θ2E) = ρσ2
(E∞βcrit (β))2.
The expected environmental damage follows from substituting the total emissions
(I.9) in the damage function (I.2) and calculating the expected value. As in Man-
dell (2008); Weitzman (1974); Williams III (2002), a price-based regulation leads
to volatile aggregate emissions, which incurs social costs. This is true whenever
E∞βcrit (β) > 0, that is, whenever there are firms that choose the tax. Emissions then
include a random component.
Denoting the expected total tax revenue by E (T ) and the expected revenue from
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permit auction by E (T auc), the optimal policy can be described by9
min
pp,zp,zq ,zaucq
∫ βcrit
0
E (Cq(β))φ(β)dβ +
∫ ∞
βcrit
E (Cp(β))φ(β)dβ (I.10)
+ E (D(E))− E (T )− E (T auc) ,
s.t. E (Cq(βcrit)) = E (Cp(βcrit)) if 0 < E∞βcrit (β) < βˆ. (I.11)
The following proposition characterizes the solution of this optimization problem.
Proposition 1. The optimal menu of policies is given by
p∗p =
e¯+ αβˆ + γδ
βˆ + δ
, (I.12)
z∗q + z
auc∗
q = e¯−
(
2βˆ − δ
)
(e¯− δ(α− γ))
2
(
βˆ + δ
) (
1− E∞βcrit (1)
) , (I.13)
z∗p = zq − ρσ2
β∗crit(βˆ + δ)
2
(
e¯+ αβˆ + γδ
) . (I.14)
Under this policy menu, the indifferent firm is implicitly characterized by
E∞β∗crit (β) =
 δ2 , for δ ≤ 2βˆ,βˆ, otherwise, (I.15)
which yields a unique solution β∗crit, whenever 0 < δ < 2βˆ. All firms with β > β∗crit
choose the tax, whereas all firms with β < β∗crit participate in the emissions-trading
scheme.
If δ < 2βˆ, the reduction in expected social costs compared to an optimally designed
permit market is ρσ2δ/8, and it is ρσ2(2βˆ − δ)2/(8δ) compared to an optimally set
emissions tax.
Proof. Calculating the derivatives of the expected social costs specified in (I.10)
with respect to pp, zq, zaucq leads to a linear equation system with rank two and the
solutions (I.12)–(I.13). The expected social costs are independent of zp, and, for
pp > 0, Eq. (I.11) is an implicit surjective mapping of zp ∈ R to βcrit ∈ [0,∞[. Thus
9The constraint (I.11) is binding, whenever both instruments are in use. In this case, there is
an indifferent firm whose technology characterizes the firms’ instrument choices.
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we can optimize (I.10) with respect to βcrit instead of zp and get (I.15). By our
assumptions on φ(β), E∞βcrit (β) is a strictly monotonic function of βcrit, whenever
0 < E∞βcrit (β) < βˆ and thus, by (I.15), whenever 0 < δ < 2βˆ. Therefore, (I.15) has a
unique solution under this condition.
If δ ≤ 2βˆ, then the Hessian of the expected social costs with regard to (pp, zq, zaucq ,
βcrit) is locally positive definite at (I.12), (I.13), and (I.15), so that these values
indeed induce minimal expected social costs. If δ > 2βˆ, then we have a boundary
optimum at E∞β∗crit (β) = βˆ, which implies that no firm chooses permit trading.
Eq. (I.14) follows from solving Eq. (I.11) under (I.12) and (I.13). That all firms with
β > β∗crit choose the tax, whereas all firms with β < β∗crit choose emissions trading
follows directly from comparing the firms’ expected costs for both instruments under
(I.12)–(I.15). Calculating the differences in the minimal expected social costs from
(I.10) for βcrit = 0 (tax only), βcrit → ∞ (permit trading only) and βcrit = β∗crit
directly yields the final two assertions.
The important point of Proposition 1 is that, for 0 < δ < 2βˆ, the optimal regula-
tion leads to a separating equilibrium, where some firms choose permit trading and
some firms choose the tax. Thus firms can be regulated with different instruments
according to their technology, even if the regulator does not know which firm uses
which technology.
For δ ≥ 2 βˆ, the optimal policy induces a pooling equilibrium in which all firms
choose the tax. In this case, the curvature of the damage function is so small that
the increase in expected damage caused by volatile emissions is outweighed by the
abatement cost reduction attributable to the higher abatement flexibility that is
facilitated by a tax. The condition δ < 2 βˆ arises instead of Weitzman’s criterion
δ < βˆ because, in our setting, firms can be regulated with different instruments.
Thus we investigate whether an additional firm should pay the tax or participate in
permit trading.10
Furthermore, the gain from using the policy menu compared to an optimally chosen
single-instrument policy is large if βˆ and δ are large and if δ ≈ βˆ. Again, this shows
that the corresponding result in Mandell (2008) can be generalized to the case of
imperfectly correlated cost shocks and a non-uniform distribution of β. If δ ≈ βˆ,
10In Weitzman’s setting, the question is whether all firms should be regulated with a price or
a quantity instrument – comparison of total social costs – whereas we investigate a marginal cost
change. Also Proposition 1 shows that the asymmetry between instruments found by Mandell
(2008) holds under more general assumptions on firm heterogeneity.
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the advantage of a price-based regulation (abatement cost reduction due to higher
abatement flexibility) and that of a quantity-based regulation (damage reduction
due to constant aggregate emissions) are closely balanced, as in Weitzman (1974).
If, in addition, δ and βˆ are large, both the abatement cost reduction and the damage
reduction are substantial. A mixed instrument, like our approach, is most beneficial
in such a situation, as it realizes much of the benefits of both instruments: it provides
flexibility to those firms that benefit most from it, and reduces the volatility of
aggregate emissions by keeping the aggregate emissions of the other firms constant.
In contrast, if a price-based regulation is strongly preferable to a quantity-based one
(δ  βˆ), the optimal policy mix induces only few firms to choose permit trading
and its advantage compared to a tax is small. Indeed, for δ ≥ 2βˆ, our approach
degenerates to a tax. For δ  βˆ, permit trading is strongly preferable to a tax in
a single-instrument context, so that the optimal policy mix includes only a small
number of tax-paying firms and thus provides only a small benefit compared to pure
permit trading.
The optimal policy menu has several interesting characteristics, which we derive in
the following corollaries.
Corollary 1. The tax in the optimal policy menu is the same tax that would be
optimal if only an emissions tax were used. Furthermore, the expected permit price
equals the tax in the optimal policy menu.
Proof. Solving the regulator’s optimization problem for βcrit = 0 (no permit trading)
yields (I.12) as a unique solution. Substituting (I.12)–(I.15) into (I.7) and calculating
the expected permit price yields the r.h.s. of (I.12).
So, the optimal policy menu is comparatively simple. It consists of an emissions tax
that should be set as if the tax were the only instrument to be implemented. Then
a sufficient number of permits are issued to assure that the expected permit price
equals this tax. This result is intuitive. Supplying permits so that the expected
permit price equals the tax assures that the expected marginal abatement costs
are the same for all firms, regardless of the instrument that they have chosen. This
minimizes the total expected abatement costs for a given level of expected emissions.
As the expected marginal abatement costs are the same for all firms, the tax (and
thus the expected permit price) can be chosen to equalize the expected marginal
damage with expected marginal abatement costs, which is a standard requirement
for a second-best policy under cost uncertainty.
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What remains is to check that all firms voluntarily choose the socially preferred pol-
icy instrument. In this way, an optimal allocation of the risk of cost changes and the
possibly resulting emissions volatility can be achieved. The remaining policy vari-
ables (zp, zaucq ) can be used to this end. The following corollary provides information
on the possible choices of these variables.
Corollary 2. Define
ω = e¯− ρσ2 β
∗
crit(βˆ + δ)
2(e¯+ αβˆ + γδ)
− (2βˆ − δ)(e¯− δ(α− γ))
2(βˆ + δ)(1− E∞β∗crit (1))
. (I.16)
a) If ω ≥ 0, then for every zp ∈ [0, ω] and for every zaucq ∈ [0, ω], a corresponding
zauc
∗
q ∈ [0, ω] or z∗p ∈ [0, ω] can be found, so that the optimal policy menu
specified in Proposition 1 can be implemented.
b) If ω < 0, then the tax exemption has to be negative to implement the optimal
policy menu specified in Proposition 1; that is, firms have to pay a fixed fee to
switch from permit trading to the emissions tax.
c) The tax exemption is always strictly smaller than the number of freely granted
permits per firm.
d) With a non-negative tax exemption, it is never optimal to auction all permits.
Proof. By (I.14), z∗q is increasing in zp. Furthermore, by (I.13), zauc
∗
q is decreasing in
zq. So, if we want to have z∗p ≥ 0, this constraint sets an upper bound for zauc∗q and
the boundary zauc∗q ≥ 0 sets an upper bound for z∗p . Calculating these constraints
from (I.13) and (I.14) shows that both equal ω as defined in (I.16). Given the
linearity of (I.13) and (I.14), any choice of (zp, zaucq ) within the interval specified
in a) leads to a feasible solution of (I.12)–(I.15) (with (zp, zaucq ) ∈ [0, ω] × [0, ω]), if
ω ≥ 0. If ω < 0, then for any zaucq ≥ 0, a zp < 0 results from solving (I.12)–(I.15).
Statement c) follows from (I.14), because the second term on the r.h.s. is strictly
positive. Statement d) follows from setting zp = 0, which leads to the minimal
number of freely granted permits for a non-negative tax exemption. According to
(I.14), this minimal number is strictly greater than zero.
Thus the optimal policy leaves one degree of freedom. Out of the four policy variables
(pp, zp, zq, z
auc
q ), only three are needed to achieve the best feasible solution. For each
instrument, one policy variable is used to set average emissions (pp, zq). At least
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one additional variable (zp or zaucq ) is necessary to induce the socially desirable
self-allocation of the firms to the policy instruments. So, it is possible to have no
tax exemption (if ω ≥ 0), in which case an appropriate number of permits has to
be auctioned. Or all permits can be granted freely, in which case an appropriate
tax exemption is necessary. The tax exemption should always be smaller than the
number of freely issued permits. Otherwise, the incentive for choosing the tax would
be too strong, as firms already profit from the higher flexibility afforded by the tax
(compare the last terms in Eq. (I.4) and (I.8)). Indeed, it might be necessary to
actively discourage firms from choosing the tax by using a negative tax exemption
(a fixed fee for not participating in permit trading). This can happen if the firms
strongly favor the greater flexibility afforded by the tax (large βˆ) or if, from a social
perspective, nearly all firms should participate in permit trading due to a strongly
convex damage function (small δ).
A further interesting question is how the switch from a conventional regulation to
the optimal policy menu affects the firms: Will such a switch increase the costs of
some firms so that they are likely to oppose the policy change, or will all firms gain?
If we do not consider auctioning permits and if we compare our policy menu with a
conventional permit market with the same number of permits per firm, the answer
is trivial. All firms can choose the same regulation, and thus no firm can lose by
having the option to choose a different regulation. The same holds for comparing
our approach with an emissions tax that equals Eq. (I.12).
However, if we compare an optimally designed permit market with our optimal
policy menu, a different answer might be possible, because if some firms choose the
tax, the aggregate marginal abatement costs of the permit-trading firms change and
thus the optimal number of permits per firm is altered. The following corollary
shows that this does not affect the firms negatively.
Corollary 3. Compared to an optimally designed permit market with freely granted
permits, the optimal policy menu characterized in Proposition 1 (without auctioned
permits) leads to smaller expected costs for every firm.
Proof. Calculating the reduction in expected costs for a permit-trading firm yields(
e¯+ αβˆ + γδ
)
(e¯− (α− γ)δ)
(
δ − 2βˆE∞β∗crit (1)
)
2(βˆ + δ)2
(
1− E∞β∗crit (1)
) . (I.17)
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For a firm that chooses to pay the tax, we get a cost reduction of(
δ − 2βˆE∞β∗crit (1)
)(
e¯+ αβˆ + γδ
)
(e¯− (α− γ)δ) + (β − βcrit)(βˆ + δ)2ρσ2
2(βˆ + δ)2
(
1− E∞β∗crit (1)
) . (I.18)
Since by construction E∞β∗crit (1) ≤ E∞β∗crit (β) /βˆ and, by Prop. 1, E∞β∗crit (β) = δ/2,
(I.17) is non-negative. By Proposition 1, only firms with β ≥ βcrit choose the tax,
so that (I.18) is also non-negative.
So, the introduction of the policy menu results in a gain for all firms compared
to an optimally designed single-instrument policy.11 As the firms’ preferences with
regard to the instrument choice stand in marked contrast to the social planner’s
preferences, this raises the question of whether the reliance on self-selection is costly
from a social perspective. Could lower expected social costs be attained if the firms
could be assigned to the instruments depending on their technologies? The following
proposition shows that the answer is negative: Even a fully-informed assignment of
firms to instruments cannot improve on self-selection.
Proposition 2. In terms of expected social costs, there is no allocation of firms to
instruments that could improve on the optimal policy menu characterized in Propo-
sition 1.
Proof. If the social planner could arbitrarily assign firms to the tax and to permit
trading, she could set the slope of the aggregate marginal abatement costs12 of the
firms paying the tax and that of the firms participating in permit trading. Let np
denote the fraction of firms assigned to the tax; let βp be their average technology;
denote the average technology of the permit-trading firms by βq; and their fraction
by nq. Consistency with the prevalence of the different technologies demands that
np + nq = 1 and that npβp + nqβq = βˆ. Let pp denote the tax and zq denote the
number of permits per firm. As the tax exemption and the auctioning of permits
have no allocative consequences in this setup, we neglect these.
Calculating the aggregated expected abatement costs of the firms assigned to the
tax yields Cp = npβp(p2q − α2 − σ2)/2. Those of the permit-trading firms are Cq =
11It is also true that all firms are at least as well off in our approach as with the assignment
used in Mandell (2008), if no permits are auctioned (each firm could select the instrument in our
context to which it is assigned there but may choose not to do so).
12Only this aggregate information is relevant from the perspective of the social planner (Roberts
and Spence, 1976).
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(nq/(2βq))((e¯ − zq)(e¯ − zq + 2αβq) − β2q (1 − ρ)σ2). The expected damage is (((e¯ −
βp(pp−α))np +nqzq)((e¯−βp(pp−α))np +nqzq + 2γδ) +n2pρσ2β2p)/(2δ). Minimizing
the sum of these terms yields the tax (I.12), a number of permits zq for which
the expected permit price equals this tax, as well as npβp = δ/2, for δ < 2βˆ, and
npβp = βˆ, otherwise, which corresponds to (I.15). This assignment leads to the same
expected social costs as the optimal policy menu.
Proposition 2 is noteworthy in that it shows that the self-selection mechanism suffices
to eliminate all welfare losses attributable to the regulator’s lack of information
with regard to the firms’ technologies. Compared to Mandell (2008) there is an
additional constraint (asymmetric information) and an additional policy variable
(tax exemption/auctioned permits). Owing to the self-selection mechanism, this
additional policy variable suffices to overcome the additional constraint, so that the
same expected social costs can be attained as in Mandell (2008).
This is somewhat surprising, given that the sorting under self-selection differs from
the intuition in Weitzman (1974). Firms with a flexible technology, and thus highly
volatile emissions, choose the tax, where the emissions volatility leads to higher ex-
pected damage. But only the slopes of the aggregate marginal abatement costs of
the two groups of firms (tax, permit trading) matter. These can be controlled with
the self-selection mechanism, because it induces a predictable instrument choice of
the firms and has the ability to control the size of each group. Indeed, compared
to a sorting based on the intuition of Weitzman (1974), where firms with a flexible
technology are assigned to permit trading, our approach leads to fewer tax-paying
firms.13 This corresponds to the relationship between the sorting of firms to instru-
ments and the size of each group of firms discussed in Mandell (2008).
An interesting question is whether enlarging the policy menu, either by introducing
a standard or by using several permit markets or several tax schemes, would yield
even better results. Proposition 2 implies that the answer is negative. Price- and
quantity-based policies differ only with regard to two effects (Weitzman, 1974): The
increase in environmental damage due to volatile emissions in a price-based regula-
tion, and the increase in the firms’ expected costs due to the reduced adjustment
options in a quantity-based regulation. The relative importance of these effects de-
13Such an assignment would sort all firms with β < βcrit to the tax and the optimal βcrit would
be characterized by Eβcrit0 (β) = δ/2 (for δ < 2βˆ) instead of (I.15). So, by the definitions of
Eβcrit0 (β) and E∞βcrit (β), the fraction of firms that choose the tax is smaller in our setup whenever
δ < 2βˆ, that is, whenever there is a permit market. As can be easily calculated, the resulting
marginal abatement costs are identical in both policy settings for both subgroups of firms.
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pends monotonically on the difference between the curvature of the aggregate cost
and that of the aggregate damage function. This implies that there is at most a
single value for the curvature of the aggregate abatement costs at which the prefer-
ability of price-based and quantity-based policies changes. Therefore, a combination
of one price-based and one quantity-based instrument suffices.14 Introducing a stan-
dard as a third policy instrument is also not welfare increasing, because a standard
is dominated in terms of social costs by permit trading.
As a final result we briefly show that our assumption that the firms differ only with
regard to β but not with regard to α is innocuous.
Corollary 4. Whenever the expected permit price equals the tax, heterogeneity with
regard to the parameter α does not influence a firm’s choice between the emissions
tax and permit trading.
Proof. The expected costs of a firm that pays the tax are not influenced by hetero-
geneity with regard to α, so that (I.4) remains unchanged. But if the firm chooses
permit trading, its expected costs are changed by the cost heterogeneity, because the
equilibrium price for permits depends on the cost functions of all firms participating
in the permit market. However, (I.7) is linear in α, so that α can be replaced in this
equation by the average value of this parameter among all firms that participate in
permit trading. Calculating the resulting expected costs and equating them with
(I.4) to identify the indifferent firm yields a condition that is independent of the
firm’s α whenever the expected permit price equals the emissions tax.
If there is additional heterogeneity with regard to the intercept of the marginal
abatement cost functions, this does not affect the self-selection mechanism. From a
firm’s perspective, the preferability of an instrument does not depend on the firm’s
value of α if the expected permit price equals the emissions tax, which is necessary
for the policy menu to be optimal. Therefore, the firms still choose their instrument
according to their cost parameter β. This is socially optimal, because α is irrelevant
for the social preferability of price or quantity instruments (Weitzman, 1974).
Our analysis has shown that the self-selection approach can be socially beneficial in
that it reduces the social costs of informational constraints. A different approach to
14In contrast, with a hybrid regulation, it is optimal to use an infinite number of instruments
(Roberts and Spence, 1976). The difference is that, in the hybrid regulation, the realization of the
cost shocks determines which instrument is actually used. Thus the policy needs to provide for an
infinite number of possible states of nature. In our approach, the instruments differ between firms,
and, as argued above, it suffices to partition firms in two groups.
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the same end is the hybrid regulatory scheme of Roberts and Spence (1976). There,
firms can decide after they have observed their actual costs whether to pay a fixed
carbon tax, to receive a subsidy, or to participate in permit trading. The difference
is whether firms choose ex-ante or ex-post. In our regulatory approach (where firms
choose ex-ante), the firms’ decisions are based solely on their production technology.
In contrast, with ex-post instrument choices, as in Roberts and Spence (1976), the
firms’ decisions are based solely on the realization of the cost uncertainty with all
firms choosing the same instrument.
To compare the relative merits of these two concepts, two effects have to be taken
into account. First, a hybrid instrument has the advantage of being cost effective;
all firms are regulated with the same instrument and their marginal abatement costs
are identical. In our approach, the realization of the permit price will almost surely
deviate from the emissions tax, so that tax-regulated firms and permit-trading firms
will have different marginal abatement costs, resulting in higher total abatement
costs. Second, both instruments reduce the costs of uncertainty by implementing a
price/quantity relationship of emissions that is closer to the marginal damage than
the constant quantity set by a conventional permit market (reduced volume error).
However, the instruments differ substantially with regard to this price/quantity
relationship.
A hybrid instrument implements a step-function consisting of an upper and a lower
price boundary and a fixed quantity in between. In contrast, our approach has
a number of firms whose aggregate emissions are constant (permit-trading firms)
and a number of firms whose aggregate emissions varies with the realization of the
cost uncertainty. For the case with perfect correlation of the cost uncertainty (as
in Roberts and Spence (1976)), the relationship between the permit price15 and
total emissions can be calculated as pq = pˆ+ 2 dE/δ, where pˆ denotes the expected
permit price and where dE is the deviation of total emissions from their expected
value. Thus our approach implements a price/quantity relationship that is linear
but steeper than the marginal damage function.16 Figure 3 depicts this relationship
15As we have two groups of firms with differing marginal abatement costs, it is not possible to
define “the” marginal abatement costs that can be related to total emissions. Relating the permit
price to total emissions is useful to illustrate the difference between the two approaches.
16A price/quantity relationship that corresponds to the marginal damage function is feasible but
not optimal. This is a consequence of the inefficiency induced by using two instruments simul-
taneously. A relationship between the permit price and total emissions that equals the marginal
damage (and thus has the smaller slope (1/δ)) would result in an ex-post efficient regulation of the
permit-trading firms; their marginal abatement costs would always equal the marginal damage.
This does not hold for tax-paying firms, which face the constant price pp. To implement the slope
1/δ, many firms would have to choose the tax, as only the aggregate emissions of tax-paying firms
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and that induced by a hybrid regulation.
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Figure I.3: Policy à la carte vs. hybrid regulation. Welfare losses in the permit
market under the policy menu (black areas) and under a hybrid regulation (grey
areas) for a small (θ1) and a large (θ2) cost shock. The additional welfare loss due
to the permit price not equaling the emissions tax is not depicted.
As this figure shows, the price/quantity relationship of our approach is closer to the
marginal damage for small shocks but further away for larger shocks. Thus it can
be expected that our approach works better than a hybrid regulation in most cases
with small levels of uncertainty, but that a hybrid regulation is preferable for cases
of high uncertainty. Of course, a hybrid regulation will use price limits that are
closer to the expected price if the uncertainty is small than if it is large. However,
it faces the problem that emissions (and thus the damage) increase strongly with a
cost shock, once the upper price limit is binding. It thus has to balance this excess-
damage caused by a low price-ceiling with the cost reduction achieved by being close
to the marginal damage for small shocks. Therefore, it cannot reduce the volume
error as strongly as our approach for small levels of uncertainty.
Furthermore, the more heterogeneous firms are, the more beneficial it becomes to
have different instruments for different firms instead of different instruments for
different realizations of the cost shocks. Thus we expect that, in most cases, our
approach will be preferable to a hybrid regulation if there is substantial firm hetero-
geneity. Figure 4 supports both of our conjectures for a numerical example.17
are variable. Thus we would have better regulated permit-trading firms but fewer of them, which
is not optimal.
17The example assumes that β and θ are uniformly distributed with β ∈ [βˆ − ∆, βˆ + ∆], and
that e¯ = 1, α = 2, γ = 2, β̂ = 3, ρ = 1, and δ = 3.
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Figure I.4: Comparison of our approach with an optimally designed hybrid regula-
tion in a numerical example; the policy menu is preferable in region A, the hybrid
regulation in region B.
I.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed an environmental policy in which regulated firms are
offered a policy menu that allows them to choose between two different instruments.
The objective of this approach is to overcome informational asymmetry with regard
to firms’ technologies in much the same way that contract-based screening devices do,
for example, in labor or insurance markets. We have shown that, under uncertainty
and asymmetric information, using such a policy menu reduces expected social costs
compared to a single instrument. With an optimized policy menu, every firm chooses
the instrument that is best from a social perspective. In this way, the asymmetric
information problem can be overcome and the welfare losses caused by uncertainty
can be reduced. Indeed, the second-best solution without asymmetric information
derived in Mandell (2008) can be attained. Finally, the optimal policy menu is
comparatively simple and thus provides an applicable solution to the problems posed
by information constraints in environmental policy.
Our investigation was inspired by the climate policy implemented in Switzerland,
where firms can choose between an emissions tax and permit trading. There are two
main differences between our model and this policy. The first difference is that the
firms that have chosen to participate in emissions trading can rescind their choice
at the end of a five-year trading period. But this is unlikely to matter, as firms
will probably become locked into their instrument choice (since a firm’s choice of
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a technology depends on whether the firm is regulated with a price- or a quantity-
based instrument (Krysiak, 2008b)). If investments involve sunk costs, a change
from one instrument to another is unlikely to occur, because a firm would either
have to use a technology that is suboptimal for the new instrument or it would have
to invest anew.
The second difference is that the tax exemption offered to firms depends on the firms’
labor costs. Our results suggest that this is suboptimal, because a self-selection
based solely on abatement flexibility would be optimal. Furthermore, the incentive
for choosing the tax seems to be too small; a large fraction of firms have opted for
permit trading. Given that the costs of emissions volatility is small for greenhouse
gases due to their long retention period in the atmosphere, this seems to be subop-
timal (Newell and Pizer, 2003). Thus the general approach used in Switzerland is
reasonable but the policy is suboptimally designed.
Altogether, our analysis shows that it is socially beneficial to let firms choose their
regulation. It has long been accepted that it is more efficient to regulate abatement
activities by using a tax or a permit price than by using a command-and-control
policy, since firms are typically better informed about the costs of their abatement
activities than a regulator. Our results suggest that this idea can be taken a step
further: Under uncertainty and asymmetric information, it is better to let firms
choose the instrument with which they are regulated than if this decision is made
by a governmental agency.
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Abstract
A long-standing theoretical discussion on the relative merits of prices vs. quantities
for regulating emissions under uncertainty exists in the environmental policy liter-
ature. However, empirical evidence with regard to instrument choice has not been
put forward so far. In particular, very little is known about instrument preferences
from the perspective of firms. Based on Swiss firm data, we address this issue by
empirically investigating a policy where firms can self-select between a tax (with a
wage-based tax exemption) and emissions trading (with a grandfathering mode of
permit allocation). Specific theory on Swiss policy design identifies the influential
factors for instrument choice as being permit allocation, wages, uncertainty in abate-
ment costs and the flexibility of firms’ abatement technologies. We confirm evidence
for the first two factors, but were unable to find evidence for the latter ones. More-
over, high-abatement firms prefer permit trading.
Keywords: Prices vs. Quantities, Instrument Choice, Swiss Climate Policy, Envi-
ronmental Policy à la Carte
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II.1 Introduction
It is widely accepted by environmental economists that market-based instruments –
like a tax or permit trading – are the preferred policy to reduce harmful emissions in
efficiency terms. If firms face uncertainty in the costs of abating these emissions, then
even the choice between a price and a quantity instrument matters. In this context,
there is extensive theoretical literature on the relative merits of the instruments: a
tax vs. permit trading vs. mixed policies.2 If, in addition to uncertainty, asymmetric
information between the regulatory authority and the firms with regard to their used
abatement technologies deteriorates the outcome, then theory suggests a “Policy à la
Carte”, i.e. a self-selection mechanism with the instrument choice being delegated to
firms (Krysiak and Oberauner, 2010). In contrast to the theory, empirical studies on
these issues are rare. Only little is known on the relative performance of prices vs.
quantities in their effective use. This shortcoming in the empirical literature applies
in particular to the analysis of the instrument preferences from the perspective of
firms.
In the present paper, we redress the lack of evidence by empirically investigating
the instrument preferences of firms when the regulatory authority allows them to
self-select between a tax and permit trading. We have chosen the self-selection
mechanism that is implemented in Switzerland as providing optimal data for our
empirical research on instrument choice from the perspective of firms. The Swiss
Confederation offers firms a policy menu to regulate carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions
from which firms can choose their preferred instrument. The policy menu consists
of a tax (charged on every ton of CO2) and permit trading (with free-of-charge
permit allocation). The revenue of tax payments is refunded to taxpaying firms
proportional to their gross wages.
This unique policy offers a challenging spectrum of empirical research associated
with the prices-versus-quantities debate. On the one hand, the performance of
different policy regimes can be analyzed under equal economic conditions. Moreover,
it offers valuable information on the incentives that this policy menu offers firms
when choosing between the tax and permit trading. The main focus of our paper
concerns the latter field of research. We empirically investigate firms’ instrument
2See for example Williams (2002) and Adar and Griffin (1976) for instrument choice between a
tax and permit trading, Hepburn (2006) for a review on the choice between a tax, permit trading
and a hybrid instrument (as proposed by Roberts and Spence, 1976), and Mandell (2008) for the
simultaneous use of a tax and permit trading compared to a single instrument policy.
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preferences thereby providing valuable insights on compliance costs associated with
specific attributes of firms that can be applied to future environmental policy design
and implementation.
Our approach for the empirical analysis of firms’ instrument preferences is the fol-
lowing. Based on the theoretical model of self-selection in environmental regulation
provided by Krysiak and Oberauner (2010), a formal decision criterion on firms’
instrument choices is derived that features the specific attributes of Swiss climate
policy design. Based on this criterion, an empirical model is constructed that is
tested for Swiss firm data.
Theory predicts firms’ instrument preferences for emissions trading whenever the
expected value of the permit allocation net of trade-specific fixed costs outweighs
the expected net benefits of paying the tax (i.e. the expected tax refund plus a
flexibility-uncertainty advantage under a tax net of tax-specific fixed costs). Our re-
sults gained from a logit regression confirm the evidence regarding permit allocation
and the tax refund. We were unable, however, to find evidence that firms’ expo-
sure to uncertainty and their flexibility in abatement technologies influences firms’
instrument preferences. Moreover, contrary to theoretical predictions, our results
revealed that high-abatement firms tend to choose emissions trading.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the existing
literature on the choice between prices and quantities in this context. Section II.3
introduces Swiss climate policy. In Section II.4, the theoretical model is presented
and the criterion for firms’ decisions between the tax and permit trading is formally
derived. Data and variables for our empirical analysis are sketched in Section II.5.
In Section II.6, the empirical results with respect to firms’ instrument preferences
are presented and discussed. Finally, we conclude in Section II.7.
II.2 Related Literature
The main theoretical foundation for our analysis originates from the prices-vs.-
quantities discussion in the environmental policy literature. While a price and a
quantity instrument perform equally under complete information, the instrument
choice becomes critical if there is uncertainty with regard to firms’ abatement costs.
In his seminal paper “Prices vs. Quantities”, Weitzman (1974) has shown that from
a social perspective firms should be regulated by a tax whenever the value of the
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slope of the marginal abatement cost function outweighs the value of the slope of
the marginal damage function in absolute terms, and uncertainty renders a first-best
outcome impossible. A quantity instrument – and more precisely a standard – is
preferable when the opposite is true. Yet, Weitzman’s findings are still valid when
the tax is compared with a quantity instrument designed to be a scheme of tradable
permits, as shown by Williams (2002).
The choice of instrument to be implemented has gained particular attention in the
context of climate change mitigation. Contributors to the discussion on instrument
choice for countering greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and stock pollutants in gen-
eral are – among others – Hoel and Karp (2002), Pizer (2002), Newell and Pizer
(2003), and Nordhaus (2007). Due to the uncertainties inherent in the regulation
of GHG emissions, the authors emphasize the relative merits of a tax. First and
foremost and in line with Weitzman (1974), they argue that flat marginal damages
of GHGs make the tax superior in efficiency terms to emissions trading. In contrast,
by adding enforceability considerations to the analysis under uncertainty, Rohling
and Ohndorf (2010) argue in support of a quantity instrument in the context of in-
ternational climate-related policies. Enforcement concerns in their paper, however,
are only an issue in the international context of national sovereignty.
Roberts and Spence (1976) were the first to introduce the concept of a hybrid in-
strument. They propose a scheme of tradeable permits with a price ceiling and a
price floor for permits (i.e. a tax and a subsidy) with an ex-post choice of instrument
depending on how the uncertainty is resolved. Their approach results in a single
instrument regime with all firms regulated by one of the three instruments. Pizer
(2002) shows that a hybrid system with a “safety valve” is a good alternative to the
tax in the regulation of greenhouse gases.
All these approaches on instrument choice in environmental regulation have one
thing in common: The authors all refer to a single instrument policy, i.e. when
the whole industry or market is regulated with one instrument. Mandell (2008), by
contrast, analyzes a policy design in which the market is separated into two groups
of firms that are regulated by different instruments simultaneously: One group of
the firms is regulated using a tax, the other group is regulated using permit trading.
Compared to a single instrument policy, an emissions level can be achieved that
more closely approximates to the efficient one, thereby reducing the welfare loss due
to uncertainty. To optimally assign the firms to the instruments, the regulatory
authority needs information on the technologies used by firms to abate emissions,
i.e. on their abatement cost structure. Firms do not have an incentive, however, to
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reveal these costs. Thus, it is reasonable to assume the abatement technologies used
by firms will be private knowledge.
In their Policy-à-la-Carte approach, Krysiak and Oberauner (2010) take this asym-
metric information problem between the regulator and the firms into account by
letting the better informed agents (firms) choose the instrument. In their approach,
the regulator offers firms a policy menu that consists of a tax and permit trading,
between which firms can self-select. Accompanied by a tax exemption and/or partly
auctioned permits, the policy menu provides appropriate incentives for firms to make
an instrument choice that is socially optimal. Thus, the same expected social costs
can be achieved as in Mandell (2008) and the asymmetric information problem can
be overcome.
To our knowledge – besides Krysiak and Oberauner (2010) – only one paper ex-
ists that explores the selection of choices available to firms for regulating pollu-
tion emissions. Delmas and Marcus (2004) discuss the firms’ preferences between a
command-and-control (CAC) instrument and negotiated agreements based on the
transaction costs incurred by those instruments. However, the authors derive neither
cost-minimizing analytical nor empirical criteria for instrument choice. Moreover,
their focus is on transaction costs, and not on the costs that accrue from abate-
ment and regulation, which are, however, the main drivers of firms’ decision-making
behavior.
II.3 Swiss Climate Policy Design
Active measures to combat climate change were implemented in Switzerland in Jan-
uary 2008. The Swiss Confederation charges a tax on CO2 emissions from the com-
bustion of fossil fuels used in generating heat, cooling or electricity.3 However, firms
can gain exemption from this tax when they commit to a legally-binding reduction
in their CO2 emissions at a predetermined level.
Concerning large emitters, the commitment to this quantity target automatically
leads to participation in the national emissions trading scheme with free permit
allocation (corresponding to their quantity target) and unrestricted trade in their
allowances. In contrast, small- and medium-sized emitters are discriminated against
by this policy. Their quantity alternative can best be portrayed as a performance-
3Carbon dioxide emissions from transport are regulated separately.
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based standard with a permit-purchase option.4 So, if firms were buyers of permits,
they can be treated as if they were fully involved in emissions trading. Potential
sellers, however, are ruled out from any trade. According to this policy design, firms
explicitly have the choice of being regulated either by a price (the CO2 tax) or by
a quantity instrument (permit trading or standard with a permit-purchase option).
For the time being, we pass over the discrimination of small- and medium-sized firms
and treat all firms as if they were unrestricted in their choice between the tax and
permit trading. We will examine this aspect more thoroughly in Section II.6 and in
Appendix II.A.3.
Specific design elements for both instruments are legally documented in the CO2 Act,
passed by the Swiss parliament in 1999 (Swiss Federal Assembly, 1999). Firms that
opted for the tax paid 12 Swiss francs on every ton of CO2 emitted in 2008. The tax
rate follows a phasing-in process that is conditional on annual national reduction
achievements.5 Tax revenues are refunded to taxpaying firms proportional to their
gross wages. According to the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment (2010c), the
tax refund rate in 2008 is approximately 37 Swiss francs per 100,000 Swiss francs
gross wages.
The national emissions trading scheme is operated in a cap-and-trade style. The per-
mit allocation method used is grandfathering6, i.e. free permit allocation based on
historic emissions, with the emission allowances referred to as Swiss Units (CHUs).
The overall cap is determined by the sum of individual emission targets of firms that
are allotted with permits.
4The Energy Agency for the Economy (EnAW) serves as an intermediator between the Swiss
Confederation and firms. It provides three quantitative commitment models for firms: (1) En-
ergy Model for large energy-intensive firms, (2) SME Model, and (3) Benchmark Model, both for
small- and medium-sized emitters. Firms in the latter models do not receive free permits when
they commit to a quantity target, but are permitted to buy emission allowances on the permit
market to cover emissions in excess of their individual targets (Swiss Federal Office for the Envi-
ronment, 2010a). Thus, Swiss climate policy design discriminates against small- and medium-sized
tax-exempted, low-abatement-cost firms by depriving them of incentives to abate beyond their
reduction target.
5 While the tax rate was not increased in 2009, it was raised to 36 Swiss francs in 2010, as the
national emission reduction target was not met in 2008.
6According to the CO2 Act (Swiss Federal Assembly, 1999), the determination of firms’ in-
dividual reduction targets is based on their historic abatement measures, the costs of abatement
measures, their international competitive position, and their expected output growth. The correla-
tion coefficients between historic emissions (2006 and 2007) and permit allocation in 2008 amount
to 0.9919 and 0.9915, respectively. Thus, it is reasonable to assume a pure grandfathering mode
of permit allocation.
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II.4 Theoretical Model
Swiss climate policy design and timing is very similar to the Policy-à-la-Carte model
provided by Krysiak and Oberauner (2010). So, we adopt their theoretical model,
adjust it for specific elements of the Swiss policy, and derive a formal decision
criterion on firms’ choices between a tax and permit trading.
In their model, Krysiak and Oberauner (2010) assume a continuum of firms with
mass one that emit a homogeneous and uniformly mixed pollutant. To reduce en-
vironmental damage from emissions, the regulator offers firms a policy menu that
consists of a tax and permit trading, from which firms choose their preferred instru-
ment for several periods (self-selection mechanism). There is uncertainty in abate-
ment costs that only resolves when the abatement decision has to be made. Besides,
the technologies used to abate emissions differs among firms and is private knowl-
edge. In their approach, Krysiak and Oberauner (2010) allow for two additional
“fine-tuning” variables (tax exemption modeled as a lump sum and partly auctioned
permits) that ensure a self-allocation of firms to instruments that is socially optimal.
This approach is adjusted to specific elements of Swiss climate policy design. First,
the tax exemption is modeled as a refund of tax revenues for taxpaying firms based
on their wages. Second, the allocation of permits is entirely free of charge and
based on (unregulated) historic emissions, i.e. grandfathering. Finally, we allow for
instrument-specific fixed costs that are supposed to differ substantially between the
tax and permit trading within the Swiss policy.7
From the policy menu, firms will prefer the instrument for which lower compliance
costs (abatement costs plus regulation costs) are to be expected. The decision
criterion for a firm’s choice is, thus, derived by the difference in the expected costs
under the instruments. Another way of thinking than in terms of abatement costs, is
that firms make their decision based on expected savings from emitting the pollutant
net of regulation costs. Using this “inverse” model makes the exposition – especially
with respect to the empirical model – more intuitive.
Accordingly, if a firm opts for the tax t, it will choose an emissions level e that
7We expect the fixed costs to be low or even zero for the tax, but substantial for permit
trading. For trading firms, these costs comprise the efforts to receive exemption from the tax, the
EnAW membership fee, consulting costs, monitoring, reporting and verification etc. Oberauner
and Krysiak (2010) specify the costs incurred under both regimes as well as the effects of the
instruments on several cost categories from the perspective of firms.
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maximizes the net savings function8
max
e≥0
St(e) = (α + θ)e− e
2
2β
− te+ τw − Ft, (II.1)
with θ being the stochastic parameter in the savings, τ the refund rate of tax rev-
enues, w the firm’s gross wages, and Ft the fixed costs incurred with the tax. Fur-
thermore, the firm’s technology is characterized by the parameters α ≥ 0 and β > 0.
Eq. (II.1) characterizes the firm’s savings from emitting a pollutant, minus the tax
payment, plus the refund share of tax revenues that is conditional on the firm’s
wages, and minus the tax-specific fixed costs.
Uncertainty is modeled by the parameter θ that is firm-specific, but correlated among
firms with ρ ∈ (0, 1]. θ has an expected value of zero and a positive variance of σ2.
Firms are heterogeneous in two dimensions: They differ in their technology param-
eter β and in their wages w.9 Let the joint density of β and w be f(w, β). From
Krysiak and Oberauner (2010), we know that firms with a flexible technology (high
β) prefer the tax, whereas firms with a low β prefer permit trading. The intuition
for this self-allocation to instruments is the following. In expected net savings terms,
firms benefit from uncertainty as they can adjust their emissions to shocks. This
effect is stronger under the tax, as the correlation between firms’ savings and the
permit price reduces the adjustment possibilities of trading firms.10 Furthermore,
the more flexible firms are in their abatement technologies (high β), the larger their
benefit from uncertainty. Consequently, more flexible firms gain most under the tax.
Firms that are indifferent between the instruments due to expected net savings equal-
ity are denoted by the technology parameter βcrit(w) which is, in turn, conditional
on wages. Hence, all firms with a combination of (w, β) such that β ∈ [0, βcrit(w))
will participate in permit trading. Otherwise, i.e. if β ∈ [βcrit(w),∞), firms will pay
the tax. Furthermore, we assume f(w, 0) = 0, f(0, β) = 0, limw→∞ f(w, β) = 0 and
limβ→∞ f(w, β) = 0.
Solving the first-order condition of (II.1) results in optimal emissions
e∗t = β(α + θ − t). (II.2)
8Subscript t indicates the tax.
9As shown by Krysiak and Oberauner (2010), heterogeneity with regard to α has no effect on
the results and is therefore assumed to be constant across firms.
10Ex-post, the permit price is determined by abatement cost realization, whereas the tax rate is
constant no matter how θ realizes.
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The refund rate τ is endogenously determined as the ratio of tax revenues to the ag-
gregate of gross wages of taxpaying firms. Given firms’ self-allocation to instruments
as proposed by Krysiak and Oberauner (2010), τ is
τ =
θE t+ t (α− t)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
βcrit(w)
βf(w, β) dβ dw∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
βcrit(w)
wf(w, β) dβ dw
, (II.3)
with θE =
∫∞
0
∫∞
βcrit(w)
βθf(w, β) dβ dw and E (θE) = 0.
By substituting Eq. (II.2) and (II.3) into Eq. (II.1) and taking expectations, we get
expected net savings of
E (St(e∗t )) =
β
2
(t2+α2)−αβt+wt (α− t)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
βcrit(w)
βf(w, β) dβ dw∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
βcrit(w)
wf(w, β) dβ dw
+
β
2
σ2−Ft. (II.4)
Analogously, if a firm chooses to participate in permit trading, it maximizes the
function11
max
e≥0
Sp(e) = (α + θ)e− e
2
2β
+ p(ψe¯− e)− Fp, (II.5)
where p denotes the price of permits, ψ the allocation rate of permits to historic
emissions e¯, and Fp the fixed costs. The price term in Eq. (II.5) is positive when
the firm is a seller of permits, and negative when the firm holds a buyer position.
The optimal level of emissions of a firm participating in emissions trading is then
e∗p = β(α + θ − p). (II.6)
The price of permits is endogenously determined, as it depends on the number of
firms that choose permit trading. Calculating the market-clearing price of permits
gives
p = α− ψe¯
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
βcrit(w)
f(w, β) dβ dw∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
βcrit(w)
βf(w, β) dβ dw
+ θp, (II.7)
11Subscript p indicates permits.
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with θp =
∫∞
0
∫∞
βcrit(w)
θβf(w, β) dβ dw/
∫∞
0
∫∞
βcrit(w)
βf(w, β) dβ dw, reflecting the price
uncertainty due to uncertainty in firms’ savings. Furthermore, we have E (θp) = 0,
E (θθp) = ρσ2 and E
(
θ2p
)
= ρσ2.
As shown by Krysiak and Oberauner (2010), for a policy menu design to be optimal,
the expected price of permits has to equal the tax rate. Then, expected marginal
savings among all firms are equalized, and firms’ net savings are at a maximum.
Thus, when choosing an instrument from the policy menu, a firm anticipates an
optimal policy, i.e. E (p) = t.
With a permit price as in Eq. (II.7), optimal emissions as in Eq. (II.6), and taking
into account that E (p) = t, the expected net savings are
E (Sp(e∗p)) = β2 (t2 + α2)− αβt+ ψe¯t+ β2 (1− ρ)σ2 − Fp. (II.8)
Given the expected net savings under both instruments, the decision criterion for a
firm’s choice of instrument is formulated as
∆ =E (Sp(e∗))− E (St(e∗)) =
= (ψe¯t− Fp)−
wt (α− t)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
βcrit(w)
βf(w, β) dβ dw∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
βcrit(w)
wf(w, β) dβ dw
+
β
2
ρσ2 − Ft
 . (II.9)
Hence, a firm chooses to participate in emissions trading whenever the expected
benefits of trading (first brackets of Eq. (II.9)) outweigh the expected benefits
under the tax (second brackets of Eq. (II.9)). Otherwise, the firm chooses to pay
the tax, i.e. when ∆ is negative. The benefits of permit trading are characterized
by the value of permits allotted to a firm minus the trade-specific fixed costs. By
contrast, the benefits of the tax comprise the refund of tax receipts (first term), plus
the flexibility advantage under uncertainty for a taxpaying firm that results from
better adjustment possibilities to shocks, and net of the fixed costs to be incurred
with the tax payment. A firm that is characterized with the technology parameter
βcrit(w) expects the benefits under the tax to be equal with those under permit
trading.
Based on Eq. (II.9), the empirical analysis requires information on a firm’s actual
choice, on the benefits it could expect when it chooses permit trading, i.e. how many
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permits it would receive, and the benefits it would anticipate when paying the tax,
i.e. indicators for its potential tax refund and its flexibility-uncertainty level.
II.5 Data and Variables
The empirical analysis of firms’ instrument choices is based on firm-level data from
Switzerland’s manufacturing industries. The data were obtained from a survey
conducted in the fall of 2009 for a research project on the effects of Swiss climate
policy on firms (Oberauner and Krysiak, 2010). The survey covered firms with a
minimum of 30 employees from manufacturing industries that are located in the
German-speaking part of Switzerland.12
The survey sample was constructed on the basis of four sources. The first and
main source is a random draft of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO) from
September 2009, drafted proportional to grouped employees and industries (FSO
survey sample). Second, a selection of emissions trading firms was added (published
in the national emissions trading registry), to increase the share of these firms in the
sample. Third and fourth, firms listed at the SIX Swiss Exchange and a selection of
ISO-14001 certified firms were integrated, as such firms were more likely to provide
the related key figures. Except for the firms that were obtained from the FSO,
selection problems arose. It was not possible to ensure conformity in all the criteria
specified for the survey.
By fall 2009, 1,829 firms were surveyed by means of a written questionnaire; 125
responded to our survey inquiry. Out of the response sample, 72 firms were left
that met the requirements for our analysis and could unambiguously be assigned to
either the tax or permit trading (response sample). Due to missing values in some
of the explanatory variables, and depending on the specification estimated, further
observations were dropped by listwise deletion.
Figures II.1 and II.2 illustrate the distributions of employees and industry affiliation
for the FSO survey and the response sample. We only consider the FSO survey
sample for comparisons, as it comprises more than 70 percent of the firms surveyed
12Only manufacturing firms were taken into account, as they are more concerned with climate
policy issues than, for example, the service industries (the involved industries are listed in Table
II.3 in Appendix II.A.1). To avoid any distortions occasioned by translation, only firms in the
German-speaking part of Switzerland were considered. We chose firms with staff of not less than
30 employees in order to increase the likelihood that the required data would be available for these
firms.
Prices vs. Quantities: An Empirical Study of Firms’ Instrument Choices 48
and as information on labor staff and industry affiliation was not available for the
remaining sources.
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Figure II.1: Distributions of firms’ (grouped) employees in the FSO survey and the
response sample.
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Figure II.2: Distributions of firms’ industry affiliations in the FSO survey and the
response sample.
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Small firms are underrepresented in our analysis.13 Distributions of firms’ industry
affiliations are quite similar. Only the shares of the food, beverages and tobacco in-
dustries and the chemical and pharmaceutical industries are disproportionately high
in the response sample, whereas energy provision, water provision and treatment and
the manufacture of wood products are underrepresented.
Testing the theoretical model of Section II.4 – and more precisely to predict instru-
ment choice according to the decision criterion in Eq. (II.9) – data on the chosen
regulatory instrument, the potential allocation of permits to all firms, firms’ gross
wages to indicate the tax refund to all firms, as well as measures of the technological
flexibility in adjusting emissions to shocks and of firms’ exposure to uncertainty were
needed. Questionnaire design specifics and data transformations on these variables
are briefly sketched below and summarized in Table II.1.
Table II.1: List of variables.
Variable Label
Instrument Dummy variable indicating instrument choice (1=emissions trading,
0=tax)
Emissions Permit allocation proxy: emissions in 2008 in tons divided by sales in
2008 [million Swiss francs]
Wages Tax refund indicator: gross wages in 2008 [million Swiss francs] divided
by sales in 2008 [million Swiss francs]
Flex ∗ Uncert Multiplicative term of two composite variables that indicate (1) firms’
flexibility of abatement technologies in adjusting emissions to abatement
cost shocks (Flex), and (2) firms’ exposure to uncertainty in abatement
costs (Uncert)
Abate_low Dummy variable indicating low overall abatement in 2008 (less than 5
%) – reference dummy
Abate_mod Dummy variable indicating moderate overall abatement in 2008 (5 – 19
%)
Abate_high Dummy variable indicating high overall abatement in 2008 (20 % or
more)
LnSales Natural logarithm of sales in 2008 [million Swiss francs]
First of all, the variable Instrument indicates instrument choice and serves as the
dependent variable in the empirical analysis. Since two instruments are offered by
the Swiss Confederation, Instrument is a binary variable and coded to be 1 if a
13Larger firms may be better informed and may collect more data on climate-related issues,
thereby facilitating questionnaire completion.
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firm participates in emissions trading and 0 if a firm pays the tax.
The dependent variable is constructed based on three survey questions, formulated to
identify the instrument assignments as being mutually exclusive. Firms were queried
on exemption from the tax, on participation in one of the models provided by the
EnAW (see Footnote 4) and, finally, on participation in permit trading. Firms have
to pay the tax whenever they purchase fossil fuels. So, they must become exempted
from it in order to avoid being within the tax regime. Only firms that participate
in the Energy Model are entitled to permit trading. The question on participation
in permit trading serves to ensure correct instrument assignment.
Second, data on the allocation of permits in 2008 were, by nature, only available
for firms involved in permit trading. The correlation between the allocation of
permits to firms in emissions trading and CO2 emissions in 2008 was, however,
almost perfect, so, the latter serves as a proxy for potential permit allocation in
2008 for all firms.14 In turn, CO2 emissions in 2008 in tons were divided by the sales
in 2008 to correct for scale effects. This emissions intensity measure is denoted by
the variable Emissions.
Third, firms were asked for their gross wages in 2008 to measure the influence of the
wage-based tax refund on instrument choice. Again, we corrected for scale effects
by dividing them by the sales in 2008. The wage intensity variable is denoted by
Wages.
Finally, to verify whether there is a flexibility-uncertainty advantage under the tax,
the composite variables Flex (to measure flexibility) and Uncert (to measure un-
certainty) were constructed. Both variables are multiple-indicator measures derived
from the four Likert items: fuel prices, input prices, output demand and break-
down of production equipment. A five-point scale was employed to indicate the
flexibility of a firm’s technology to adjust emissions to shocks and its exposure to
fluctuations with regard to each item. The scores of the items were averaged to
14CO2 emission data were also available for the year 2006, i.e. before climate policy was an-
nounced by the regulator. The correlation between emissions in 2006 and the allocation of permits
in 2008 amounts to 0.9919. However, some observations would have been dropped using this
proxy due to missing values. Besides, CO2 emissions of firms that were allocated permits in 2008
are published in the national emissions trading registry, operated by the Swiss Federal Office for
the Environment (2010b). Thus, data quality could have been improved by correcting for errors
and missing values when the firm’s identity was known. For these reasons, we preferred to use
2008 emissions data, i.e. when climate policy measures were already implemented (the correlation
coefficient between 2006 and 2008 emissions data amounts to 0.9816). The correlation between
CO2 emissions in 2008 and permit allocation in 2008 for firms participating in emissions trading
and observations used to estimate the empirical model specifications of Section II.6 is 0.9891.
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form a flexibility and a uncertainty score for each firm. 5 represents the highest
level of flexibility/exposure to uncertainty and 1 the lowest. What matters for test-
ing the theoretical model, is the multiplicative term of Flex and Uncert labeled as
Flex ∗ Uncert.
To control for further influencing factors, sales in 2008 (LnSales) and the overall
abatement activity were included in the empirical model. The natural logarithm
of sales in 2008 serves to detect potential scale effects in instrument choice. With
regard to abatement, firms were asked on a seven-point response scale to report
their overall abatement of CO2 emissions in 2008 compared to a situation with no
abatement at all. The scale was reduced to three categories with a dummy variable
constructed for each category: (1) Abate_low indicating abatement lower than 5
percent (reference category); (2) Abate_mod indicating abatement between 5 and
19 percent; and (3) Abate_high indicating abatement of 20 percent and above.
The small size of the sample and the wide range of industry classes (see Table II.3 in
Appendix II.A.1) made it impossible to reliably control for industry-specific effects.
Moreover, since the data on emissions intensities are significantly non-homogeneous
within a class of industry15, even the use of a dummy variable on emissions-intensive
industries is considered inappropriate. For example, although the pharmaceutical
industry is associated with emissions-intensive industries, it also covers firms with
low intensity. This might be attributable, for example, to fuel substitution or to
a firm’s core business operating at a low-emission stage in the production chain.
Therefore, we consider firm-level comparisons based on emissions intensities, i.e.
by the variable Emissions, to be more adequate than any comparisons based on
industry affiliation.
II.6 Results and Discussion
The full sample used for the empirical analysis consists of 30 firms that participate
in emissions trading and 42 that pay the tax. Because of missing values, the listwise
deletion procedure reduced the sample size conditional on the explanatory variables
involved.
Due to the binary character of the dependent variable Instrument, a logit model
15The ranges of the reported emissions intensities are seriously high within all classes of indus-
tries.
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is used for estimation. Thus, in our empirical model, the conditional probability of
choosing emissions trading has the form
Pr(Instrumenti = 1|x) =Λ(β0 + β1 ∗ Emissionsi + β2 ∗Wagesi (II.10)
+ β3 ∗ Flex ∗ Uncerti + β4 ∗ Abate_modi
+ β5 ∗ Abate_highi + β6 ∗ LnSalesi),
with Λ(·) as the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution.
Our theoretical model predicts a positive influence of Emissions on instrument
choice, i.e. when the allocation with free permits is increased, the probability of
choosing emissions trading is expected to rise. Hence, we expect a positive value
for the estimated coefficient. In contrast, firms benefit from a high tax refund
when wages are high, making the tax more attractive. The coefficient’s sign for
Wages is therefore expected to be negative. Theory also suggests a negative effect
of the flexibility-uncertainty level (Flex∗Uncert) on firms’ preferences for emissions
trading. The remaining control variables included in the empirical model are the
abatement dummies and the log-transformed sales. Descriptive statistics on these
variables are listed in Table II.4 in Appendix II.A.2 for various model specifications.
The results of the logit estimation with all the explanatory variables included are
presented in the first column of Table II.2. The coefficients of Emissions andWages
exhibit the correct signs and are statistically significantly different from zero at the
1 percent level for Emissions and at the 5 percent level for Wages. This is not
true, however, for Flex ∗ Uncert and for LnSales. The z-values do not indicate a
reliable influence on instrument choice for these variables.16 Concerning the latter,
scale effects in firms’ preferences are, thus, not to be observed.
16Alternative measures of Flex and Uncert were used to test the model. Among others, dummy
variables were constructed from validity questions that directly asked about flexibility of abatement
technologies and uncertainty in abatement costs. All alternative measures had one thing in common
with the actual measures used, Flex and Uncert: the coefficients’ signs and the z-values do
not indicate a statistically significant and monotonously increasing influence of flexibility and
uncertainty on the predicted probability of choosing the tax. The effects of these alternative
measures exhibit, however, robustness in the residual variables with regard to sign, significance
and magnitude of coefficients.
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Table II.2: Logit regression for instrument choice.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Instrument Instrument Instrument
Emissions 0.104∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(3.04) (3.12) (3.39)
Wages -22.70∗∗ -26.09∗∗ -27.01∗∗∗
(-2.08) (-2.53) (-2.74)
Flex*Uncert 0.130 0.132
(0.85) (0.85)
Abate_low reference reference reference
Abate_mod 3.573 3.853∗ 4.510∗∗
(1.55) (1.78) (2.14)
Abate_high 4.039∗ 4.188∗ 5.077∗∗
(1.70) (1.87) (2.29)
LnSales 0.247
(0.73)
Constant -3.615 -2.084 -1.495
(-1.09) (-0.86) (-0.63)
Observations 62 62 72
p-Value (F -Test) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.610 0.604 0.628
Count R2 0.887 0.871 0.875
z statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
With respect to the negative influence of the flexibility-uncertainty level on choosing
emissions trading – as suggested by the theoretical model – evidence cannot be
provided using the Swiss data. This may be attributed to the fact that in Switzerland
not only the permit price is uncertain but also the tax rate. If the national emission
reduction targets could not be achieved in previous years, the tax rate is subsequently
gradually increased. Indeed, in 2010 the tax rate was increased from 12 Swiss francs
in 2008 and 2009 to 36 Swiss francs (see Section II.3 and Footnote 5). So, when
choosing an instrument for several periods, Swiss firms are not only subject to price
uncertainty in the permit trading regime, but also in the tax regime. Hence, given
the specific design of the tax rate in Switzerland, uncertainty concerns are not an
issue in instrument choice when firms were the ones to decide on the instrument.
In turn, in Model 2 and Model 3, we re-estimated a reduced specification omitting
LnSales in the former, and both, LnSales and Flex ∗Uncert, in the latter, leading
to a larger sample size in Model 3.17 Compared to the Model-1 specification, we
17A Likelihood-Ratio test indicates that the variables LnSales and Flex∗Fluc should be removed
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observe robust results for the emissions and wage intensity (both on a 1 percent
significance level). In addition, overall abatement in 2008 indicates a statistically
significant, positive influence on instrument choice at the 5 percent level in the re-
duced model. So, firms tend to opt for emissions trading when abatement efforts are
relatively high. However, theory would suggest that the rational firm sets marginal
abatement costs (marginal savings from emitting) equal to the price or to the tax
and solves for optimal abatement (emissions). With regard to expectations, optimal
abatement (emissions) is (are) the same for both instruments. So, from a theoretical
point of view, variances in abatement efforts should not be an issue with respect to
instrument choice.
One possible reason for this result might be that firms participating in permit trading
have the prospect of being able to bank their permits beyond the Kyoto period, i.e.
beyond 2012.18 Legislation on Swiss climate policy might be more restrictive in
future periods, i.e. the tax might be increased and the cap for permits might be
reduced. Moreover, the free permit allocation mode might be partly substituted
by auction (Swiss Federal Council, 2009). In addition, the Swiss Confederation
intends to link up the national emissions trading system with the system run by
the European Union (EU ETS) no later than 2013 (Swiss Federal Office for the
Environment, 2009). A more restrictive policy in the European Union after the
Kyoto period may force Swiss policy design to become more stringent in order to
be accepted for linkage by the European Commission. These aspects might induce
permit trading firms to increase abatement efforts today to build up a bank of
permits for future policy periods. Inter-period banking with a 1-to-1 permit ratio
may, however, be an obstacle to linking up with the EU ETS.
Our empirical model (Model 3) has a high predictive power. Instrument choice is
correctly classified (i.e. predicted choice corresponds to observed choice as expressed
by Count R2) in 87.5 percent of the cases.19 So, for the firms incorrectly classified
(1 − Count R2), unobserved factors are crucial. For firms incorrectly classified in
the trading regime, these may be the fixed costs that are substantial under permit
trading (see Footnote 7). High fixed costs may lead some (probably relatively small)
from the model.
18Banking to periods beyond 2012 is not established by law so far. However, the Swiss Federal
Office for the Environment (2007b) specifies the prospect of banking in its commentary on the
CO2 ordinance (CO2-Verordnung). Additionally, the Swiss Federal Council (2009) documents the
possibility of banking in its proposal to the revision of the CO2 Act.
19Firms were classified as being 1 (i.e. emissions trading) if their predicted probability was above
0.5. Classification towards the tax then consistently indicates a predicted probability equal to or
below 0.5.
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firms to choose the tax that would have preferred the trading regime otherwise. For
firms incorrectly classified in the tax regime, one might put forward three arguments.
First, firms may have expected to gain from an overallocation in the trading regime
due to a lower production induced by the economic recession. However, data of
our empirical analysis refer to the year 2008 with firms’ instrument decisions met
at a point in time20 when the first signs of the economic recession were observable,
but not its actual dimension. Second, some municipalities and power companies
grant discounts to firms affiliated with the Energy Model (see Footnote 4), e.g.
when purchasing electricity (Energy Agency for the Economy, n.d.). Third, firms
in emissions trading benefit from instrument choice flexibility. Non-compliance is
sanctioned with a tax payment on every ton of CO2 emitted (Swiss Federal Assembly,
1999). This means that, large firms in particular, for which trade-specific fixed costs
are relatively small, may benefit from selling their permits and paying the tax for
their emissions, when the realized permit price is above the tax rate.
The outstanding model fit indicates that our empirical model covers the most influ-
ential determinants of instrument choice; moreover, it only requires a few variables
to predict firms’ preferences between a tax and permit trading correctly with a high
degree of probability. So, for a regulator implementing a self-selection mechanism,
the task of estimating firms’ choices and influencing the outcome by setting the
policy variables appropriately is relatively easy.
As the coefficients of Model 3 in Table II.2 represent logits that do not have an
intuitive interpretation, we illustrate the dependency of the predicted probabilities
on the emissions and on the wage intensity for reference values of the remaining
variables in Figures II.3 and II.4, respectively.
Figure II.3 depicts the positive relationship between the emissions intensity and the
probability of choosing emissions trading for reference values of the wage intensity.
Thus, as the ratio of CO2 emissions to sales increases, firms benefit from a higher
allocation with free permits, making emissions trading more attractive. If the wage
intensity is low, then even a relatively low level of emissions intensity suffices for the
gain from the tax refund to be outweighed by the benefits from permit trading. By
contrast, firms with a high wage intensity prefer the tax, except when the emissions
intensity is at a relatively high level. Then, the tax refund is high and firms are
better off under permit trading only when their allocation of permits is at a high
level.
20Submission deadline for applications for exemption from the tax for the year 2008 was Septem-
ber 1, 2007 (Swiss Federal Council, 2007).
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Figure II.3: The probability of choosing emissions trading conditional on the emis-
sions intensity for various levels of the wage intensity, while holding the abatement
dummies constant at their respective mean values (Model 3); the wage intensity for
the reduced sample is positively skewed, thus, the median of the wage intensity lies
above its mean.
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Figure II.4: The probability of choosing emissions trading conditional on the wage
intensity for various levels of the emissions intensity, while holding the abatement
dummies constant at their respective mean values (Model 3); the emissions intensity
is even more positively skewed than the wage intensity.
Prices vs. Quantities: An Empirical Study of Firms’ Instrument Choices 57
Figure II.4 draws the same picture for the probability of choosing emissions trading
conditional on the wage intensity for various levels of the emissions intensity. The
higher a firm’s wage intensity, the higher is the probability of choosing the tax.
For firms at a low level of emissions intensity, the probability of opting for the
tax increases when wages increase. Thus, firms with a low level of potential permit
allocation are better off with a tax, due to the relatively high refund of tax payments.
Firms with a relatively high emissions intensity, by contrast, will only be willing to
choose the tax when their wage intensity is comparatively high and the tax refund
outweighs the value of the potential permit allocation.
Figures II.3 and II.4 not only reflect the empirical evidence of the theory with regard
to emissions and wages presented in Section II.4, but also confirm that firms behave
as suggested by the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment (2007a), which recom-
mends participation in emissions trading whenever firms exhibit high CO2 emissions
in conjunction with low wages and a tax payment in the reverse situation.
Table II.2 presents the results of the logit estimation for all firms in the sample,
no matter how much CO2 they emit and independent of firm size. Firms that
exhibit energy costs of at least 200,000 Swiss francs are unrestrictedly permitted to
participate in emissions trading when they decide on the quantity regime (Energy
Agency for the Economy, n.d.). In contrast, for small- and medium-sized firms,
the Swiss Confederation established quantity targets that correspond to a mixture
of a performance-based standard and emissions trading (see Section II.3, and in
particular Footnote 4). Firms with energy costs below 200,000 Swiss francs do not
receive free permits and have no incentive to overcomply with their reduction target.
But they are permitted to cover their excess emissions with permits purchased on
the permit market in case they should fail to reach their quantity targets. Therefore,
freedom of instrument choice between the tax and permit trading is not guaranteed
in the sample used for the Model-3 specification.
Restricting our sample to only those firms that are completely free to choose be-
tween the tax and permit trading leads to an increased preference towards emissions
trading.21 This effect is relatively weak and may not carry over when applied to even
small- and medium-sized firms, as only large emitters are considered in our freedom-
of-choice sample. Fixed costs associated with participating in emissions trading are
substantial compared to the tax (see Footnote 7), shrinking the benefits of free
permit allocation.
21The freedom-of-choice estimation results are presented in detail in Appendix II.A.3.
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II.7 Conclusions
In our paper, we empirically investigate firms’ preferences in their choice between a
tax and permit trading when the regulatory authority delegates instrument choice
to firms. Such a self-selection mechanism is implemented on firms’ carbon dioxide
emissions in Switzerland. With Swiss firm-level data, we were, thus, able to con-
tribute to the prices-vs.-quantities literature with an empirical study on instrument
choice from the perspective of firms.
The theoretical framework for our analysis is provided by Krysiak and Oberauner
(2010). When there is uncertainty with regard to firms’ abatement costs and, in
addition, asymmetric information between the regulatory authority and the firms,
they show that a “Policy à la Carte” (i.e. a policy mechanism that is based on
firm self-selection between a tax and permit trading) dominates a single instrument
regime in expected welfare terms. Based on this theoretical approach and taking
specific Swiss climate policy characteristics (pure grandfathering of permits, wage-
based tax refund for taxpaying firms) into account, firms’ instrument preferences
were empirically analyzed using Swiss firm data.
From a theoretical point of view, firms prefer emissions trading whenever the ex-
pected benefits of trading (the value of potential permit allocation minus trade-
specific fixed costs) outweigh the expected benefits of paying the tax (the tax re-
fund, plus a flexibility-uncertainty advantage of the tax, and minus tax-specific fixed
costs).
The empirical results indicate that the potential permit allocation and the wage-
based tax refund are indeed crucial in a firm’s choice of instrument. If a firm’s wages
are low – and in turn a firm’s tax refund – then the benefits under the price regime
are more easily compensated for by the benefit of free permits in emissions trading,
leading firms to prefer the quantity instrument. If, however, firms have high wages
and also expect only a low allocation with permits, then they tend to prefer the
price regime, due to a more dominant tax-refund incentive.
In contrast to our findings regarding permit allocation and the tax refund, we are not
able to provide empirical evidence in support of the theoretical model with respect
to the flexibility-uncertainty advantage under the tax that derives from the better
adjustment possibilities of emissions to shocks. The famous finding of Weitzman
(1974) that in the presence of uncertainty in abatement costs the choice between
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a price and a quantity instrument matters, does not carry over when instrument
choice is left to the firms. In our empirical analysis, firms’ preferences between a
tax and emissions trading are unaffected by their exposure to uncertainty. However,
this may be a result that is specific to Swiss firms as they face price uncertainty
under both regimes.
Furthermore, and contrary to theoretical predictions, firms’ instrument decisions are
influenced by their abatement activity: High-abatement firms prefer participation in
emissions trading, a result that may be attributed to the banking of permits beyond
the Kyoto period.
Overall, the estimation of our empirical model results in a convincing model fit,
although covering only a few, but the most influential variables. Thus, with only
a little information on firms, we were able to predict a firm’s choice for one of
the instruments correctly with a high degree of probability. Given these results, a
regulator can easily estimate how firms are likely to behave given that she possesses
the necessary key facts on firm characteristics so that she is able to adjust existing
policies or to design future policies in order to achieve a high level of efficiency.
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II.A Appendix
II.A.1 Industry Classes
Table II.3: NOGA 2008 General Classification of Economic Activities (Swiss Federal
Statistical Office, 2008).
Code Industry
10 Manufacture of food products
11 Manufacture of beverages
12 Manufacture of tobacco products
13 Manufacture of textiles
14 Manufacture of wearing apparel
15 Manufacture of leather and related products
16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture;
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
17 Manufacture of paper and paper products
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media
19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
24 Manufacture of basic metals
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment
31 Manufacture of furniture
32 Other manufacturing
33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment
35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
36 Water collection, treatment and supply
37 Sewerage
38 Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery
39 Remediation activities and other waste management services
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II.A.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table II.4: Descriptive statistics conditional on model specification.22
Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Model 1 and 2
Instrument 62 0.419 0.497 0 1
Emissions 62 32.654 58.614 0.015 287.692
Wages 62 0.238 0.133 0.008 0.730
Flex*Uncert 62 9.034 3.631 1.5 17
Abate_mod 62 0.435 0.500 0 1
Abate_high 62 0.306 0.465 0 1
LnSales 62 4.153 1.666 1.501 9.852
Model 3
Instrument 72 0.417 0.496 0 1
Emissions 72 33.631 56.071 0.015 287.692
Wages 72 0.240 0.127 0.008 0.730
Abate_mod 72 0.417 0.496 0 1
Abate_high 72 0.306 0.464 0 1
Model 4 and 5
Instrument 42 0.619 0.492 0 1
Emissions 42 46.056 67.241 1.073 287.692
Wages 42 0.216 0.120 0.008 0.571
Flex*Uncert 42 9.447 3.557 1.667 17
Abate_mod 42 0.500 0.506 0 1
Abate_high 42 0.333 0.477 0 1
LnSales 42 4.650 1.598 1.589 9.852
Model 6
Instrument 51 0.588 0.497 0 1
Emissions 51 45.682 62.771 1.073 287.692
Wages 51 0.222 0.115 0.008 0.571
Abate_mod 51 0.471 0.504 0 1
Abate_high 51 0.314 0.469 0 1
22The mean of the dependent variable Instrument indicates the percentage of firms in emissions
trading for the respective specification.
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II.A.3 Results from a Freedom-of-Choice Estimation
Specifications of Model 4, 5 and 6 in Table II.5 are the freedom-of-choice analogues
of Model 1, 2 and 3 (for the descriptive statistics see Table II.4 in Appendix II.A.2).
Hence, observations used in Model 6 are a subsample of the observations used in
Model 3. All permit trading firms are still in the sample as they fulfill the criteria for
freedom of instrument choice anyway. However, the subsample includes only those
taxpaying firms that exhibit energy costs above 200,000 Swiss francs and were, thus,
unrestrictedly free to choose permit trading.
Table II.5: Logit regression for instrument choice with freedom of choice.
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Instrument Instrument Instrument
Emissions 0.0798∗∗ 0.0796∗∗ 0.0892∗∗∗
(2.48) (2.47) (2.79)
Wages -20.11∗ -21.20∗∗ -21.43∗∗
(-1.95) (-2.18) (-2.37)
Flex*Uncert 0.136 0.135
(0.84) (0.82)
Abate_low reference reference reference
Abate_mod 2.920 2.980 3.758∗∗
(1.44) (1.49) (2.03)
Abate_high 3.831∗ 3.914∗ 4.907∗∗
(1.77) (1.84) (2.39)
LnSales 0.103
(0.28)
Constant -2.129 -1.463 -1.107
(-0.66) (-0.67) (-0.51)
Observations 42 42 51
p-Value (F -Test) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.502 0.500 0.557
Count R2 0.857 0.857 0.863
z statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The signs of the estimated logits are the same for both classes of specifications, i.e.
with and without restrictions in freedom of choice. But there are small differences
in the statistical significance and in the magnitude of the coefficients. Again, Flex∗
Fluc and LnSales are omitted from the full model with freedom of choice (Model 4)
for the same reasons as above, which results in the Model-6 specification. Goodness
of fit in Model 6 (expressed by Count R2) is only less than one percentage point lower
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in the freedom-of-choice specification, whereas the Pseudo R2 increases. Hence, by
and large, robustness in the results can be observed. Freedom of instrument choice
enhances the predicted preferences of firms towards emissions trading – which is
a natural result of abolishing the restriction in choice – but this only to a small
degree. There are only two firms classified under emissions trading that would have
preferred the tax with Model-3 estimation.
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Figure II.5: The probability of choosing emissions trading conditional on the emis-
sions intensity with restricted and unrestricted freedom of choice, holding the wage
intensity and the abatement dummies constant at their respective mean values
(Model 3 and 6).
The graphical representations of the effect of freedom of choice on the predicted
probabilities are displayed in Figures II.5 and II.6. When firms are free to choose
between the instruments, the probability of choosing emissions trading is higher for
all levels of emissions intensity (Figure II.5). Analogously, if we plot the probability
curve as being dependent on the wage intensity (Figure II.6), the freedom-of-choice
cumulative distribution function is always above the one with restrictions.
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Figure II.6: The probability of choosing emissions trading conditional on the wage
intensity with restricted and unrestricted freedom of choice, holding the emissions in-
tensity and the abatement dummies constant at their respective mean values (Model
3 and 6).
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under Different Policy Regimes:
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Abstract
Based on survey data of Swiss manufacturing firms, we empirically investigate the
incentives provided by different policy instruments for firms to invest in abatement
technologies. More specifically, we compare a tax and emissions trading. In Switzer-
land, both instruments are used simultaneously to regulate carbon dioxide emissions.
Therefore, we are able to analyze possible differences regarding the investment in-
centives induced by these instruments. The results from a bivariate and multivariate
analysis indicate the superiority of free permits over an emissions tax in promoting
abatement technology adoption, a result that is diametrically opposed to the tradi-
tional theoretical result.
Keywords: Abatement Technology Adoption, Prices vs. Quantities, Emissions
Tax, Emissions Trading, Swiss Climate Policy
JEL classification: Q55, Q58, Q54, O33, O38
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III.1 Introduction
It is well known that in a static framework market-based instruments, like an emis-
sions tax or permit trading, dominate command and control policies (CAC) for
regulating harmful emissions in terms of cost efficiency. From a dynamic point of
view, the criteria by which environmental policy instruments may be judged are the
incentives they provide to spur the use of advanced abatement technologies (Kneese
and Schultze, 1975). While the spectrum of theoretical research is extensively elab-
orated in both contexts, empirical studies are rare. In particular, the differential
impacts of different policy regimes on technological change are a widely unexplored
field of empirical research. Our current study attempts to contribute to this stream
of literature by providing an empirical study on the behavior of firms in adopting new
abatement technologies when they are regulated either by an emissions tax or else
by emissions trading. Swiss carbon dioxide mitigation strategies provide an optimal
policy framework for investigating this research question. Here, firms can choose
between an emissions tax and permit trading. By accounting for self-selection, the
differential impacts on technology adoption can be analyzed under otherwise equal
economic conditions.
There is a comprehensive theoretical literature on the relative merits of prices vs.
quantities with respect to their impacts on firms’ adoption decisions concerning
abatement technologies (see, for example, a review by Requate, 2005). The tra-
ditional result of the theoretical literature signifies that a tax provides stronger
incentives to adopt new abatement technologies than free permits (e.g. Milliman
and Prince, 1989; Jung et al., 1996).
In contrast to the theoretical research, little is known about the differential impacts
of employing an emissions tax vs. tradeable permits in promoting technology adop-
tion in practice. The main reason is that there are hardly any environmental policy
designs implemented in practice that provide a regulatory framework appropriate
for answering the current research question. Ideally, there would be an economy in
which one group of firms is regulated with a tax, while the other group is regulated
by emissions trading with the instruments being assigned randomly. With its imple-
mentation of active climate policy measures in 2008, Switzerland is close to achieving
these ideal conditions. The Swiss Confederation established a “Policy à la Carte”
(Krysiak and Oberauner, 2010) that consists of a tax on carbon dioxide emissions
and a system of tradeable permits (grandfathering), from which firms can choose
their preferred instrument. By using data from Swiss manufacturing firms, we were
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thus able to identify the instruments’ differential impacts on abatement technology
adoption with all other economic conditions being equal. In order to avoid any
bias from the self-selection of instruments, we use an econometric procedure in our
empirical analysis that accounts for endogeneity.
Swiss climate policy not only offers an outstanding opportunity to answer the current
research question, but also permits an empirical investigation of prices vs. quantities
issues in environmental regulation in general. This research could produce important
insights that can be applied to future environmental policy designs. Oberauner
(2010) provides the first research contribution on this topic that uses Swiss data. In
her empirical study, she explores the instrument preferences of firms when they can
self-select between a tax and permit trading.
The results of our current empirical analysis indicate that a system of tradeable
permits induces stronger incentives for abatement technology adoption than a tax
regime. Both, a bivariate analysis of the investment expenditures for CO2 abatement
technologies under a tax vs. an emissions trading regime, and a multivariate analysis
with firms’ investment intensities in the first year of climate policy implementation
as the outcome variable of interest, lead to this conclusion. While the prevailing
view of the theoretical literature emphasizes the dominance of an emissions tax in
this context, empirical evidence suggests the opposite. Uncertainty issues, transition
effects of policy implementation and different perceptions in the stringency of the
instruments might explain our findings. It should be noted, however, that the small
sample size restricts the set of statistical methods used to analyze the data and that
crucial assumptions underlying the econometric models used are violated. Despite
these weaknesses, the results of the empirical analysis are clear, qualitatively robust
and based on multiple statistical methods applied to the analysis of the best data
available: Tradeable permits dominate the emissions tax in providing incentives for
abatement technology adoption.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the existing
literature on the differential impacts of prices versus quantities in environmental
regulation in spurring technological change. Section III.3 introduces Swiss climate
policy. Survey issues, data and variables are discussed in Section III.4. The results
from the empirical analysis are presented in Sections III.5 and III.6. In a first step,
we conduct a bivariate analysis to gain a first impression of the direction of poten-
tial instrument-related differences in technology adoption. Then, in a multivariate
analysis causal relationships are analyzed to isolate the instrument-related effect.
Finally, we conclude in Section III.7.
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III.2 Related Literature
Comprehensive literature exists on the impacts of environmental policy instruments
on technological change in a theoretical setting. Prominent studies in this field are,
for example, those of Mendelsohn (1984), Milliman and Prince (1989), Jung et al.
(1996), Requate and Unold (2001), Requate and Unold (2003), and Zhao (2003). A
review is provided by Requate (2005).
Mendelsohn (1984) integrates technical change into the prices vs. quantities model
of Weitzman (1974). This leads the Weitzman result to shift in favor of the quan-
tity instrument due to excessive levels of emissions, and in turn, excessive levels of
technical change under the price instrument.
Both, Milliman and Prince (1989) and Jung et al. (1996), provide rankings in pro-
moting technological change for the main environmental policy instruments when
all or none of the firms within an industry adopt the new technology. While the
former consider the incentives provided by the instruments to firms, the latter show
the results from the perspective of an industry. Both studies favor an emissions
tax as opposed to free permits. The new technology reduces marginal abatement
costs and consequently, the permit price shifts to a lower level, thereby reducing
the incentives for technology adoption. In aggregate, a firm’s savings from the new
technology are then higher under the tax compared to free permits.
In contrast to this earlier literature, Requate and Unold (2001, 2003) endogenize
the number of adopting firms. Depending on the fixed installation costs of the
new technology, all or none of the firms adopt under the tax, while among the
permit-trading firms all, none or some of them (with some firms free-riding on the
decreasing permit price) adopt. Compared to the social optimum, taxes lead to
overinvestments; permits lead to underinvestments. If the regulator anticipates the
new technology before it is adopted, then permits induce socially optimal adoption.
In the case of an emissions tax, under- and overinvestment is possible (Requate and
Unold, 2003).
In a general equilibrium framework, Zhao (2003) adds uncertainty considerations to
the analysis of a tax and tradable permits in encouraging abatement investments.
He shows that firms’ investment incentives are more likely to be maintained under
a system of tradable permits when shocks lead to abatement cost uncertainties.
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In contrast to the theoretical literature, empirical studies on abatement technology
adoption under different policy regimes are rare. Jaffe et al. (2002), Vollebergh
(2007a), and Vollebergh (2007b), for example, point out that first and foremost
data availability limitations are responsible for the lack of empirical evidence. Volle-
bergh (2007b) reviews the existing empirical literature on the differential impacts of
market-based and non-market-based instruments on technological change. Among
these is the study by Kerr and Newell (2003). Besides providing evidence of a positive
response of regulatory stringency on technology adoption during the U.S. petroleum
refinery phasedown of lead in gasoline, the authors observe significantly higher in-
centives for technology adoption under a regime of tradeable permits compared to
a performance standard.
To our knowledge, empirical studies on the differential impacts of an emissions tax
and free permits do not exist. Answering the current research question requires
that we investigate an economy that makes use of both a tax and an emissions
trading system, implemented under similar economic conditions. Such conditions
are currently provided by Swiss climate policy.
III.3 Swiss Climate Policy Design
For the Kyoto period, active measures to mitigate climate change were implemented
in January 2008 in Switzerland.1 First and foremost, these measures comprise a tax
on carbon dioxide emissions (“CO2-Abgabe”) and a system of tradeable permits.
Private individuals and firms are charged the tax on every ton of CO2 emitted
from the combustion of fossil fuels for heating and energy generation2, which is
deducted directly from the fossil fuel invoice. Starting with a rate of 12 Swiss francs
in 2008, the tax is gradually increased when national annual reduction targets are
not achieved.3 The revenues collected from firms are refunded to taxpaying firms
proportionally to their gross wages.
1Swiss climate policy is primarily legally documented in the Federal Act on the Reduction of
CO2 Emissions (Swiss Federal Assembly, 1999), or short CO2 Act, and the CO2 Ordinance (Swiss
Federal Council, 2007). The former comprises the CO2 mitigation strategies and targets; the latter
regulates the measures for operationalizing the CO2 Act.
2Carbon dioxide emissions from transport are regulated separately.
3While the tax rate remained constant until the end of 2009, the Swiss Confederation raised the
levy on carbon emissions to 36 Swiss francs in 2010, as CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion
in 2008 were above the predetermined target (Swiss Federal Office for the Environment, 2009).
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Yet, firms can gain exemption from the tax when they commit to an ambitious,
legally-binding CO2 reduction target. Tax-exempted large emitters are then allo-
cated a number of emission permits that corresponds to their reduction commitment,
with one certificate allowing the owner to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide. Firms
are then free to trade their allowances within the national emissions trading system.
So, basically, emissions trading in Switzerland is operated in a cap-and-trade style
with aggregated individual emission targets from trading firms as the cap and with
a grandfathering mode of permit allocation, i.e. based on historic emissions and
free-of-charge.4
Hence, emitters of CO2 from fossil fuel combustion are offered the choice between
either being regulated by a tax or else by permit trading.5 This unique and excep-
tional climate policy design offers an interesting and outstanding field for empiri-
cal research: Under equal economic conditions, a price and a quantity instrument
are implemented, providing the opportunity to reveal potential differences in their
impacts on important economic variables. Firm preferences between the tax and
tradeable permits were already investigated by Krysiak and Oberauner (2010) in a
theoretical setting and, based on Swiss firm-level data, by Oberauner (2010) in an
empirical setting. By using the same firm data, we are able to investigate the differ-
ential impacts of prices vs. quantities on technology adoption and thereby advance
this important field of empirical research.
4The CO2 Act specifies the criteria for permit allocation to be a firm’s historic abatement
measures, the costs of abatement measures, the firm’s international competitive position, and its
expected output growth (Swiss Federal Assembly, 1999). Running a correlation between historic
emissions (2006 and 2007) and permit allocation in 2008 yields, however, an almost perfect correla-
tion (correlation coefficients 0.9919 and 0.9915 respectively). Thus, evidence suggests that permit
allocation is based solely on historic emissions.
5As far as small- and medium-sized emitters are concerned, discrimination in instrument choice
prevails. When they choose to gain exemption from the tax, their quantity regulation option is
devised as an individual emission standard, and, in case they fail to meet their specific target,
they are permitted to buy allowances on the emissions trading market. However, discrimination
occurs, as they are prohibited from selling excess emissions on the market (Swiss Federal Office for
the Environment, 2010). So, they are only partly linked to emissions trading (conditional on their
abatement costs for CO2 emissions), thereby challenging their integration within our research study.
However, survey responses of small- and medium-sized emitters that chose a quantity standard was
negligible. So, restricting our sample only to taxpaying firms and firms that are fully involved in
permit trading considerably facilitates our analysis. Firm size with respect to the amount of
CO2 emitted, however, is a variable that has to be controlled for in our multivariate analysis to
justify this abstraction.
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III.4 Data and Variables
For our empirical analysis, we use firm-level data of Swiss manufacturing industries
obtained from a survey conducted in fall 2009.6 The overall survey sample comprised
1,829 firms with a response rate of 7 percent (127 firms). Of these responding firms,
107 firms met the requirements for our statistical analysis. Furthermore, the sample
size is reduced depending on the variables used for statistical analysis due to missing
values. More details on the survey and the responses are provided by Oberauner
and Krysiak (2010) and Oberauner (2010).
From our database, we use data on the investment expenditures for CO2 abatement
technologies, on firms’ instrument choices, on their abatement activities, on their
CO2 emissions, and on their wages. Questionnaire specifics and data transformations
of these variables are discussed below. An overview is provided in Table III.5 in
Appendix III.A.1.
First of all, our data sample comprises investment expenditures for the following
three time periods: (1) the time period prior to 2008, i.e. the time in absence of
any active climate policy measures; (2) the year 2008, i.e. the first year in which the
tax and permit trading were in place; and (3) prospectively for the years 2009 and
2010.7 Investment expenditures serve as an indicator to measure firms’ propensities
to adopt advanced abatement technologies, with the 2008 data as our outcome of
interest.
We transformed the absolute expenditures data to intensities in order to correct
for scale effects, i.e. we constructed ratios based on sales in 2008. The intensities
are denoted by Investhist for the time prior to 2008, Invest08 for the year 2008,
and Investfut for the prospective time period 2009/2010. The ratio values are used
in both our bivariate and our multivariate analysis. Besides, the log-transform of
Investhist and Invest08 were used in our multivariate analysis, with the intensity
rations based on sales in million Swiss francs to avoid negative numbers.8 The
natural logarithm of the intensities are analogously denoted by lnInvesthist and
lnInvest08.
6The survey was conducted for a research project to empirically evaluate the effects of national
climate policy measures on Swiss firms (Oberauner and Krysiak, 2010).
7The last time period is partly forward-looking as the survey was conducted in fall 2009. Nev-
ertheless, it is reasonable to assume that firms pursue their investment plans in the medium run.
8For our analysis, we used the user-written Stata command cmp (Roodman, 2010) which is
not appropriate for Tobit estimation with a lower limit unequal to zero. With this scaling, it was
possible to construct a zero lower bound even for the log-transformed intensity data.
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Second, a firm’s choice of policy instrument shows up in the binary variable Regime,
with Regime = 0 when a firm chose to pay the tax, and with Regime = 1 when a
firm chose to participate in emissions trading. Regime is constructed based on three
questions to unambiguously identify instrument affiliation: Firms were queried on
exemption from the tax, on participation in one of the models provided by the Energy
Agency for the Economy (EnAW),9 and on participation in permit trading. Firms
have to pay the tax whenever they purchase fossil fuels. Usually, tax exemption
goes along with EnAW-model participation with large energy-intensive firms being
entitled to permit trading. The question regarding participation in the emissions
trading scheme only served to verify whether firms’ policy regime affiliations were
correctly recorded.
Third, to indicate abatement activity, firms were asked on a seven-point response
scale to report overall CO2 abatement in 2008 compared to a situation with no
abatement at all. The answer scale was reduced to three categories with a dummy
variable constructed for each category: (1) Abate_low indicates low abatement (< 5
percent; reference category); (2) Abate_mod indicates moderate abatement (5 – 19
percent); and (3) Abate_high indicates high abatement levels (≥ 20 percent).
Forth, CO2 emissions in tons in 2008 relative to sales in 2008 in million Swiss francs
are denoted by Emissions. This emissions intensity variable serves as a proxy for
the potential permit allocation firms would have received under emissions trading
(see Footnote 4).
Finally, Wages indicate a firm’s potential refund of tax receipts, an incentive pro-
vided for firms to choose the tax regime. Therefore, firms’ gross wages in 2008
relative to their sales in 2008 were taken. For more details on the construction of
Emissions and Wages see Oberauner (2010).
In the next two sections, the empirical analysis results are presented. In a first step,
the data on investment expenditures were analyzed using bivariate methods (Section
III.5). Then, documented in Section III.6, the causality between the investment
expenditures and the regulatory instruments, on the one hand, and other potential
influencing factors, on the other hand, were investigated using multivariate methods.
9The EnAW serves as an intermediator between the Swiss confederation and firms. It provides
three quantitative commitment models to firms. Large energy-intensive firms are intended to
join the so called Energy Model in conjunction with permit trading participation. For small-
and medium-sized firms, two different models with emissions reduction targets were designated,
allowing them only to buy emission allowances when they fail to meet their specific targets (see
also Footnote 5).
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III.5 Results from a Bivariate Analysis
Due to varying time horizons of the investment intensity data for abatement tech-
nologies, interperiod comparisons are not meaningful. We therefore only compare
the tax subset with the permit trading subset within the periods in order to de-
tect any significant differences in mean investment expenditures. For the bivariate
analysis a Wilcoxen rank-sum test10 was conducted. The results of this test and mea-
sures of central tendency are summarized in Table III.1. The distributions of firms’
(grouped) investment intensities are illustrated in Figure III.1 for the subsamples.
Table III.1: Investment intensities in percent: Median (med), mean and Wilcoxon
rank-sum test (WRST); observations in subsamples: Investhist: Nt = 65, Np = 29;
Invest08: Nt = 66, Np = 34; Investfut: Nt = 64, Np = 33. Subscripts t and p
denote the tax and permits, respectively.
Variable Medt Medp Meant Meanp WRSTa P (x|Regime = 0) >
P (x|Regime = 1)b
Investhist 0 % 0.9823 % 0.9595 % 2.9351 % 0.0000∗∗∗ 24.1 %
Invest08 0 % 0.2205 % 0.4937 % 1.3069 % 0.0000∗∗∗ 21.6 %
Investfut 0 % 0.3333 % 1.0113 % 0.8648 % 0.0056∗∗∗ 33.7 %
a p value of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test with significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
b Probability that the investment intensity from a random draw of the group of taxpaying firms (Regime = 0) is
larger than from a random draw of the group of permit trading firms (Regime = 1).
While the majority of taxpaying firms did not make any CO2-related investments at
all, the majority of trading firms exhibit a positive investment intensity in all time
periods. This is not only reflected by the median but also by the mean. The mean
investment intensity of trading firms is always higher than that of taxpaying firms
except in the period 2009/2010; this, however, is only due to a statistical outlier
in the tax subsample with substantial expenditures for CO2 abatement technologies
relative to 2008 sales. In every time period, investment intensities of permit trading
firms are significantly higher than those of taxpaying firms at a 1 percent level.
10The Wilcoxon rank-sum test is a non-parametric, distribution-free rank-sum test to measure
differences in the distribution of two independent populations (tax vs. emissions trading). It tests
for differences in location, spread and shape of the distributions (Keller and Warrack, 2003). H0:
The two population distributions are equal. H1: The distribution of population tax differs from
the distribution of population emissions trading.
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Figure III.1: Firms’ intensities of investments in CO2 abatement technologies
(grouped); observations in subsamples: Investhist: Nt = 65, Np = 29; Invest08:
Nt = 66, Np = 34; Investfut: Nt = 64, Np = 33. Subscripts t and p denote the tax
and permits, respectively.
From these results it becomes obvious that there are significant differences in the
technology adoption behavior of the two subsets. This effect can be observed, how-
ever, independent of climate policy implementation in January 2008. This raises
the question of whether policy implementation had an effect on the CO2-related
investment behavior of firms at all, and if so, whether it makes a difference when a
firm is either regulated by a tax or else by permit trading. For this purpose, firms
were queried on a five-point response scale to classify the effect of climate policy
measures on their investment decisions with respect to CO2 abatement technolo-
gies. The bivariate analysis results of firms’ responses are presented in the first row
of Table III.2; Figure III.2 illustrates how firms’ responses are distributed on the
response scale.
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Table III.2: Investment- and R&D-related effects of climate policy implementation:
Median (med) and Wilcoxon rank-sum test (WRST); observations in subsamples:
Nt = 64, Np = 38. Subscripts t and p denote the tax and permits, respectively.
Response scale: strong decrease, moderate decrease, no change, moderate increase,
strong increase.
x Medt Medp WRSTa P (x|Regime = 0) >
P (x|Regime = 1)b
Investment in CO2
abatement technology
moderate
increase
moderate
increase
0.0000∗∗∗ 26.9 %
Other investments no
change
no
change
0.5055 47.3 %
R&D expenditures in
CO2 abatement technologies
no
change
no
change
0.9100 50.5 %
Other R&D expenditures no
change
no
change
0.6898 48.7 %
a p value of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test with significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
b Probability that x from a random draw of the group of taxpaying firms (Regime = 0) is larger than from a
random draw of the group of permit trading firms (Regime = 1).
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Figure III.2: Effects of climate policy on investments in CO2 abatement technologies;
observations in subsamples: Nt = 64, Np = 38.
The median confirms a moderate increase in investments in CO2 abatement tech-
nologies for both groups of firms. This result indicates that both measures – the tax
and permit trading – stimulate firms’ willingness to invest into abatement technolo-
gies due to policy implementation. However, for the permit trading group the policy
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impact is stronger than for the tax paying group: While 94.7 percent of trading firms
report a moderate or strong increase in their investments, the value of tax-paying
firms is only 64.1 percent. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test therefore gives a statistically
significant difference in the distribution of the two groups with a probability of 73.1
percent that permit trading firms appear with a higher value on the response scale
of this question.
With respect to abatement technology adoption and innovation issues, interesting
conclusions can be drawn from data generated by three more questionnaire items
concerning the effects of climate policy implementation (see Table III.2). First,
changes in all investment expenditures were addressed, except those for abatement
technologies. Although investment in CO2 abatement technologies increased moder-
ately for the median firm in both subsamples, investment expenditures for all other
business activities remained unchanged. Consequently, we might conclude that firms
make CO2-related investments additionally and that there are no crowding-out ef-
fects. A second and third conclusion resulted from the consideration of R&D expen-
ditures: The median firm is unaffected by climate policy in its R&D expenditures
on CO2 abatement technologies and in its R&D expenditures of all the other busi-
nesses. The analysis results of all three items share one thing in common: There is
no significant difference between the instrument groups.
The results from the bivariate analysis are a good indicator that differences do exist
in the technology adoption behavior of firms conditional on the policy instrument
with which they are regulated. Permit trading seems to dominate the tax in provid-
ing incentives to adopt abatement technologies. It should be kept in mind, however,
that firms self-select their preferred instrument. It is reasonable to assume that firms
choose the instruments according to their specific attributes, so that instrument af-
filiations are not random. This fact has to be taken into account before drawing any
conclusions on abatement technology adoption behavior under different regulatory
regimes. Therefore, multivariate analysis allowing for endogenous instrument choice
is required to draw inferences on causal relationship between the use of different reg-
ulatory regimes and the technology adoption behavior of firms. The results of this
analysis and the econometric methods employed are presented in the next section.
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III.6 Results from a Multivariate Analysis
Research on technological change usually requires a dynamic approach with the
empirical analysis based on panel data. Our data sample, however, comprises only
a snapshot in time, i.e. cross-sectional data for the year 2008. Firms were asked to
report data regarding their expenditures on CO2 abatement technologies for three
time periods, but with varying time horizons. Due to these data limitations, we
follow an alternative approach to determine the differential effects that different
environmental policy regimes may have on technology adoption. Therefore, we use
the investment intensity of the first year in which climate policy instruments were
implemented (Invest08) as our outcome of interest and make it dependent on historic
expenditures (Investhist) as a proxy for a firm’s stock of abatement technologies prior
to climate policy implementation. A firm’s instrument choice between the tax and
permit trading (Regime) is then the dummy regressor of primary interest.
Estimating the regime-dependent effects on technology adoption with our Swiss firm
data is not straightforward. The difficulty in estimation basically arises from two
data characteristics, but also from small sample size.
First, a significant proportion of firms exhibit zero investment expenditures, while
the other firms display positive levels of expenditure. Thus, our dependent variable
is left-censored with a masspoint at zero.
Second, as the Swiss Confederation allows firms to choose between instruments, it is
natural to assume that firms’ choices are not random. From the set of instruments,
they choose the one under which they expect lower costs. As analyzed by Oberauner
(2010), instrument choices are driven by firms’ emissions intensities, their wage
intensities and their abatement efforts. So, firms make their decisions according to
their specific characteristics and attributes. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that
firms’ decisions on investment expenditures are not independent of their decisions
for one of the instruments (self-selection bias).
Finally, the small sample size restricts the number of regressors used and even rules
out the use of some statistical methods.11
These concerns, the censored nature of investment expenditures, the endogeneity
11Calculating average treatment effects with permit trading firms in the treatment group and
taxpaying firms in the control group failed in the construction of a convincing counterfactual due
to small sample size. Furthermore, using a two-step procedure for the left-censored dependent
variable results in the estimation’s collapse.
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problem of the explanatory variable Regime, and the limited applicability of sta-
tistical methods make the econometric analysis a challenging task. Given these
peculiarities, a simultaneous two-equation model with one equation being a Tobit-
type to account for censoring of the dependent variable Invest08, and the other
equation being a Probit-type to estimate Regime, appeared to be the most appro-
priate method with which to approach our research question. Firms’ instrument
choices are modeled in line with Oberauner (2010) except for using a Probit rather
than a Logit model.12 We allow the two equations to be correlated in their error
terms in order to address the assumption of endogeneity of Regime. The decisions of
firms and the respective empirical models are illustrated in Figure III.3 in Appendix
III.A.2.
The formal exposition of the simultaneous Tobit-Probit model (STP) is given by
Eq. (III.1) to Eq. (III.5).13 The first equation characterizes the outcome of interest
y1 (i.e. Invest08). The second equation models firms’ choices of instrument y2
(i.e. Regime). Both equations formalize limited dependent variables, thus requiring
latent variable notation.
y∗1i = αy2i + β1X1i + ε1i (III.1)
y∗2i = β2X2i + ε2i (III.2)
y1i =
y∗1i if y∗1i > 00 if y∗1i ≤ 0 (III.3)
y2i =
1 if y∗2i > 00 if y∗2i ≤ 0 (III.4)
E (εji) = 0; E (εji)2 = 1; E (ε1iε2i) = ρ (III.5)
for j = 1, 2 and i = 1, . . . , n
y∗ji refers to the latent variables and indicates firms’ propensities to invest in abate-
ment technologies and their propensities to choose emissions trading, respectively.
12For the estimation of the Tobit-Probit model, we used the user-written Stata command cmp
that does not provide Logit estimation. Given the identical sample of firms and the model con-
version factor of Amemiya (1981), model choice has only a negligible impact on the coefficients
estimated.
13For ease of exposition, we use the generic notation y and x to refer to the outcome variables
and the regressors, respectively.
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yji denotes the observed variables with y1i being left-censored and y2i being binary,
α is a scalar coefficient, βj the vectors of coefficients, Xji the vectors of regressors,
and εji the error terms. The expected values of the error terms are zero; the vari-
ances are one. Furthermore, the error terms are assumed to have a bivariate normal
distribution with a correlation coefficient ρ measuring the endogeneity of y2 in Eq.
(III.1).
X1i comprises the variables Investhist, i.e. the proxy for the stock of abatement
technologies, and the dummy variables Abatemod and Abatehigh in order to control
for firms’ abatement levels. Alternative specifications of our empirical model were
estimated including the variables Investfut, Emissions and the log-transformed
sales in 2008. However, based on a Likelihood-ratio test, no statistically significant
influence of these variables on Invest08 could be observed. Hence, to keep the num-
ber of regressors small, these variables were not further considered in our analysis
when investment intensities served as the dependent variable. Following Oberauner
(2010), X2i consists of the regressors Emissions, Wages, and again the abatement
dummies.
The STP model was estimated using the user-written STATA command cmp (con-
ditional mixed-process estimator; Roodman, 2010). The STP results are compared
to single equation estimations of Eq. (III.1) and Eq. (III.2), i.e. for the case in
which ρ = 0 with firms’ instrument choices and their investment decisions treated
as being independent of each other. Moreover, we ran a simple OLS regression for
Eq. (III.1) for the purpose of comparison.14 The estimated coefficients of the various
models are presented in Table III.3, the marginal effects for the Tobit and the STP
model in Table III.4, and the summary statistics of the variables in Table III.6 in
Appendix III.A.3.
Table III.4 shows the latent variable and unconditional marginal effects for the Tobit
and the STP coefficients, holding all other variables constant at their mean values.
The latent variable marginal effects measure changes in the mean of y∗ and equal the
estimated coefficients when the regressors are continuous (β = ∂E (y∗) /∂x); the un-
conditional marginal effects denote the changes in the censored mean of the observed
investment intensities in 2008 (∂E (y) /∂x). The marginal effects of the dummy vari-
ables were calculated as the discrete changes, e.g. the censored mean of Invest08
14For censored data, OLS estimation is biased and not consistent. The linear regression model
ignores the cluster of zeros of the dependent variable and that y1 cannot be negative. The higher the
share of zeros, the greater is the discrepancy between the Tobit and the OLS results. Furthermore,
constant marginal effects are unrealistic when a considerable share of the dependent variable has
a value of zero (Winkelmann and Boes, 2006).
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(E (y|x)) increases by 0.0091 when Regime turns from 0 to 1, i.e. from the tax to
the permit trading regime.
Table III.3: Estimation results for the intensity of investments in CO2 abatement
technologies with the investment intensities modeled in levels.
OLS Probit Tobit STP
Regime 0.0054 0.0133∗ 0.0250∗∗∗
(1.2221) (1.9152) (3.0085)
Investhist 0.3780∗∗∗ 0.4119∗∗∗ 0.3857∗∗∗
(5.5371) (4.0775) (4.1526)
Abatemod −0.0039 0.0186∗ 0.0146
(−0.8426) (1.8211) (1.4107)
Abatehigh 0.0029 0.0302∗∗∗ 0.0265∗∗
(0.5796) (2.8717) (2.4848)
Constant −0.0010 −0.0367∗∗∗ −0.0391∗∗∗
(−0.3742) (−4.1496) (−4.1302)
Emissions 0.0678∗∗∗ 0.0651∗∗∗
(3.5957) (3.4855)
Wages −15.5659∗∗∗ −13.6494∗∗∗
(−2.9279) (−2.7999)
Abatemod 2.5613∗∗ 2.7244∗∗
(2.3543) (2.5110)
Abatehigh 2.9185∗∗ 2.9587∗∗∗
(2.5048) (2.6065)
Constant −0.8561 −1.3131
(−0.6979) (−1.1432)
σ 0.0220∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗
ρ −0.7647∗∗
N 84 72 84 88
N cens. 44 44
N uncens. 40 40
R2 0.3923
Adj. R2 0.3616
Pseudo R2 0.6312
R2MZ 0.5357 0.5628
t or z statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The marginal effects of the abatement dummies require thorough consideration. The
marginal effect of Abatemod measures the increase in the investment intensity when
abatement is raised from a low to a moderate level (Abatehigh = 0). The marginal
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effect of Abatehigh coherently depicts the effect when moderate abatement turns to
high abatement (Abatelow = 0).15
For the STP model, the coefficients of Regime and Investhist exhibit positive signs
and are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. With regard to the
abatement dummies, a statistically significant influence can only be observed when
abatement is at a high level.
Table III.4: Latent variable and unconditional marginal effects for Tobit and STP
regressions in levels with discrete changes of the dummy variables.
METobit MESTP
E (y∗|x) E (y|x) E (y∗|x) E (y|x)
Regime 0.0133 0.0046 0.0250 0.0091
Investhist 0.4119 0.1268 0.3857 0.1149
Abatemod 0.0186 0.0043 0.0146 0.0033
Abatehigh 0.0116 0.0055 0.0119 0.0051
Due to a high share of censored observations in our sample (about 52 percent), OLS
estimates deviate considerably from the Tobit and the STP estimates. Furthermore,
the STP model shows up with a statistically significant correlation between the error
terms, i.e. from a statistical point of view, firms’ decisions on how much money to
spend on advanced abatement technologies actually depend upon their instrument
decisions.
Goodness of fit measures – expressed by McFadden’s R2 for the OLS regression and
by McKelvey and Zavoia’s R2 for the Tobit and the STP regression – indicate a
high predictive power of the STP model compared to OLS, and even a considerable
improvement compared to the single Tobit estimation.16
In addition to the results in Table III.3 with the investment intensities in levels, we
ran regressions with the intensities transformed to logs. The results are presented in
15Typically, standard commands of statistical software produce discrete-change effects for dum-
mies when they turn from 0 to 1, holding all other regressors at their mean values. For categorical
variables, erroneous results were generated with these commands by treating the residual category
dummies as standalone regressors. Calculating the discrete effects from low to high abatement
or from low to moderate and moderate to high abatement generate correct results. We chose the
more plausible second alternative.
16In a Tobit model, McFadden’s pseudo R2 is meaningless as the dependent variable is contin-
uous but limited and can therefore take values that are either positive or negative (Cameron and
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Table III.7 in Appendix III.A.4. For both, estimations in levels and logs, we observe
the following qualitatively robust effects.
First, in promoting the adoption of advanced abatement technologies, tradable per-
mits dominate the tax. Our empirical analysis thereby contradicts the traditional
theoretical literature argument (brought forward, e.g. by Milliman and Prince, 1989
and Jung et al., 1996) that a tax provides stronger incentives than free permits.
This result is unexpected, not simply because it is the exact opposite of what the
theoretical literature predicts, but also because compelling reasons are observed in
practice that would further indicate that taxes provide higher adoption incentives.
The current tax rate is comparatively high (36 CHF). Although, the tax rate was
only 12 CHF in 2008, national emission reductions were expected to be low and
consequently the tax rate was expected to be raised sooner or later by the Swiss
Confederation. Moreover, a trading platform for permits did not evolve. So, the
emissions trading scheme was unable to deliver a reliable price signal for permits.
In addition, trade volumes were negligible in 2008 (Swiss Federal Office for the
Environment, 2008). On the one hand, this is due to the missing trading platform,
but first and foremost due to the overallocation with permits.17 Based on these
aspects, the observed relative stringency appears to be higher under the tax regime.
Thus, we would presume higher technology adoption under the tax regime due to
higher compliance costs.
As shown by Requate and Unold (2003), underinvestment under a tax might occur
if the regulator anticipates the new technology before firms adopt. This might not
have happened in Switzerland when policy measures were designed. Swiss climate
policy is the result of a long political compromise that did not fully account for
efficiency criteria and policy-induced technological progress.
However, uncertainty may be a plausible reason for our empirical findings. In prac-
Windmeijer, 1997). Therefore, we report McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2
R2MZ =
N∑
i=1
(yˆ∗i − y¯∗)2
N∑
i=1
(yˆ∗i − y¯∗)2 +Nσˆ2
,
as proposed by Veall and Zimmermann (1996). The authors claim that this measure provides the
best possible comparability across an OLS and a Tobit model.
17Comparing the national allocation plan with the actual emissions in 2008 leads to this conclu-
sion (Swiss Federal Office for the Environment, n.d.a and Swiss Federal Office for the Environment,
n.d.b).
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tice, abatement costs are exposed to considerable volatility (e.g. shocks in input
prices or output demand) that influence the investment strategies of firms. Usu-
ally, firms regulated by a tax know whether their potential abatement technology
investment is profitable once the tax rate is announced. In contrast, the volatile
permit price impairs a firm’s planing security. As analyzed by Insley (2003), firms
delay their investment decisions in a system of tradeable permits since uncertainty
raises the option value of the investment. The author points out that once the new
technology is installed, the option to invest is forgone and consequently the option
to alternatively buy allowances when the future permit price is low. In our Swiss
data, we cannot observe permit trading to be delayed compared to the tax; the op-
posite seems plausible and may be due to late policy announcement in June 2007.18
Investment expenditures are typically planed at least over the medium term. So,
firms’ adaptive behavior to climate policy implementation may not be fully reflected
in the 2008 investment expenditure data. There is also the fact that a number of
trading firms voluntarily engaged in emission reductions within the framework of
the EnAW (see Footnote 9) prior to policy implementation, i.e. they might have
started to invest in abatement technologies before any mandatory measures were in
place. So, transition effects may be less prevalent with trading firms than with firms
under the tax regime.
In contrast to Insley (2003), Zhao (2003) argues that both, firms under a tax and
firms under tradeable permits, are affected by uncertainty as – in an efficient permit
market – price volatility stems from abatement cost uncertainty, which reduces plan-
ing security under both regimes. In this context, a system of tradeable permits is the
preferred instrument. Moreover, as the Swiss Confederation raises the tax rate when
national annual emissions targets are not achieved (see Footnote 3), an additional
uncertainty dimension is added to the tax regime. However, it has to be noted that
the uncertainty argument may not tell the whole story. The effect of uncertainty in
firms’ decision behaviors might be overestimated. As shown by Oberauner (2010),
even already in firms’ instrument choices, uncertainty has no significant impact.
Besides transition effects and uncertainty, it may be reasonable that the perceived
policy stringency is responsible for the dominance of free permits in providing incen-
tives for technology adoption. The tax is included in the fossil fuel invoice amount
and represents only a small percentage of fossil fuel costs (about 3 Rappen per liter
of heating oil). Moreover, the volatility of fossil fuel prices makes the tax even less
18The policy was announced by the end of June 2007 and implemented by January 2008 (Swiss
Federal Office for the Environment, 2007).
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apparent. Within the emissions trading regime, firms commit to reduction targets
and define reduction measures together with the EnAW, who continually monitors
firms’ compliance progress. A firm’s management and its affected workforce may feel
more committed in complying with the policy and may develop a growing awareness
of environmental and climate protection issues. This could possibly lead them to
invest without delays. Thus, although there is no price signal for tradeable permits,
firms may perceive a more stringent regulation in the permit regime compared to
the tax.
Second, besides Regime, the results of Tables III.3 and III.4 as well as Table III.7
in Appendix III.A.4 indicate that the investment decisions of firms are further influ-
enced by their historic investment expenditures, which can be treated as their stock
of abatement technologies. Firms’ investment expenditures increase with their pre-
policy expenditures for abatement technologies. The positive stock effect is, however,
the opposite of what Kerr and Newell (2003) found for the U.S. lead phasedown,
where previously adopted technology had a negative effect on current adoption. As
we do not have investment intensity data for the year 2007, we are not able to infer
implications about the effect of policy implementation on technology adoption itself.
Third, firms’ overall abatement activities play a double role in our empirical model.
On the one hand, firms are more likely to participate in emissions trading rather than
pay a tax when they act at a higher abatement level – a result derived by Oberauner
(2010). On the other hand, given instrument choice, high abatement encourages
firms to increase their investments in abatement technologies. Our results indicate
a monotonic increase in investment intensities when abatement rises. This is a
convincing result, since increases in abatement typically arise from cost-reducing
new abatement technologies.
Finally, as already mentioned above, empirical evidence cannot be provided with
respect to sales in 2008, Investfut, and Emissions. Regarding sales, we would
expect that firm size enhances investment expenditures due to, for example, scale
economies or better access to financial resources as empirically put forward, for
example, by Kerr and Newell (2003). The fact that we cannot observe a significant
influence of future investment plans is surprising, as our results also indicate a
robust positive stock effect for the transition from the pre-policy period to our first
period of regulation (2008). We would expect that firms’ intentions to adopt new
technologies in future affect their decisions today. With regard to Emissions, we
observe statistical significance with the abatement dummies, which are a better
indicator for expressing the environmental impacts anyway.
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While these results are a good first indicator on the instrument-related effects, we
have to admit three major concerns with our approach which need to be addressed
by future research.
First of all, econometric model assumptions are violated. In general, a Tobit estima-
tion depends crucially on the assumptions of normal error terms and homoskedas-
ticity, which is a serious issue with regard to our results in Table III.3. A Lagrange
multiplier test indicates a strong rejection of the normality and homoskedasticity
hypotheses. As investment intensities in 2008 are heavily skewed and have a con-
siderable non-normal kurtosis, it was reasonable to run the regressions with log-
transformed intensity data (i.e. lnInvest08 and lnInvesthist).19 The analogue of
Table III.3 with the log-transformed data are presented in Table III.7 in Appendix
III.A.4. Yet, log-transformation did not solve the problem. Again, the estima-
tions failed to provide normality and homoskedasticity of the predicted error terms.
Furthermore, retransformation problems arose in this context that are discussed
in further detail in Appendix III.A.4. With the normality and homoskedasticity
assumptions violated, caution in the interpretation and the communication of our
results is required. Nevertheless, we observe qualitatively similar economic effects
for almost all models estimated and for the dependent variable modeled in levels
and logs, respectively.
Second, a larger sample size is necessary in two respects. On the one hand, a larger
cross-section would be desirable to improve the applicability of other econometric
techniques that are potentially better suited to the problem and to increase the
representability and the validity of the results. On the other hand, evaluating our
research question with panel data is a more appropriate approach for identifying the
dynamic effects of technological change.
Finally, to measure the regime-dependency of technology adoption, we used invest-
ment expenditure data of 2008, i.e. data of the first year in which climate policy
measures were established. Historic investment (i.e. prior to policy implementation)
served as one of the regressors to control for the policy-independent stock of abate-
ment technologies. Future investment (2009/2010) was omitted from the regression
models as no statistically significant influence was to be observed. The fact that only
one data point in time was used, and specifically the first year of policy implemen-
tation, may be problematic as there may be transition effects from a non-regulatory
period to a period of regulation.
19See Table III.5 and Footnote 8 for the different scaling of Invest08 and lnInvest08, respectively.
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These issues indicate that standardized and periodical surveys with mandatory firm
participation are required to provide a solid and representative data pool for the
analysis of this research question. One has to keep in mind, however, that the out-
standing economic conditions provided by Swiss climate policy might not continue
indefinitely to provide a paradise for empirical research on prices vs. quantities. Cli-
mate policy design in Switzerland may change for the post-Kyoto period, and the
unique conditions may be destroyed, e.g. the revised CO2 Act for the post-Kyoto
climate stipulates compulsory participation in permit trading for emission-intensive
firms (Swiss Federal Assembly, 2011).
From the bivariate and the multivariate analysis, we can draw one general conclusion:
Although our firm sample is small and there are statistical weaknesses, the methods
used consistently indicate that there are stronger incentives for technology adoption
under free permits. While the bivariate analysis gives a first indication on the
direction of this effect, the multivariate analysis confirms evidence that tradeable
permits may be superior in promoting technology adoption in practice.
III.7 Conclusions
To our knowledge, this study is the first contribution to the empirical literature on
the differential impacts of an emissions tax and a system of tradeable permits in
promoting advanced abatement technology adoption. The unique design of climate
policy in Switzerland, with both instruments implemented simultaneously, allows us
to investigate the incentives that both regimes may induce in this context. The Swiss
Confederation usually lets energy-intensive firms choose among a tax and tradeable
permits to regulate carbon dioxide emissions. Thus, based on Swiss firm data, the
differential impacts of the instruments could be analyzed with all other economic
conditions being equal.
The conclusions of our empirical study can be drawn from the results of both, a
bivariate and a multivariate analysis. In the bivariate analysis, we compare the in-
tensities of abatement technology investments of permit trading firms with those of
firms that pay an emissions tax for three time periods: (1) prior to climate policy im-
plementation, (2) in the year of implementation, i.e. 2008, and (3) a forward-looking
period 2009/2010. In all three periods, investments in CO2 abatement technologies
are dominated by emissions trading firms, independent of policy implementation.
Besides, firms under both regimes report a moderate increase in abatement technol-
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ogy investments since the policy measures were introduced. However, this effect is
stronger for firms under tradeable permits.
Our multivariate analysis comes to a similar conclusion: Compared to the tax, emis-
sions trading seems to provide stronger incentives for firms to adopt advanced abate-
ment technologies. Our analysis is based on the assumption that a firm’s decision
between the tax and permit trading (a variable that is binary) is not independent of a
firm’s decision on how much money it invests in advanced CO2 abatement technolo-
gies (a variable that is censored from the left at zero). We approach a simultaneous
Tobit-Probit model to account for this endogeneity problem.
Besides the influence of the instrument, pre-policy investments drive a firm’s expen-
ditures for abatement technologies. The more money a firm spends prior to policy
implementation, the more likely is the firm to invest once the regulation is in place.
So, a stock effect is observed that reflects the dynamics of investments. Moreover,
but with limited statistical evidence, firms’ abatement levels influence their decisions
on how much money to spend on CO2 abatement technologies. No evidence can be
brought forward, however, with regard to firms’ sales, their future investments in
CO2 abatement technologies, and their emissions intensities.
Admittedly, the multivariate analysis suffers from the small sample size and, more-
over, the crucial econometric model assumptions are violated. In spite of these
weaknesses, the study provides insights into the main drivers of firms’ investment
expenditures on abatement technologies under different regulatory regimes in prac-
tice. Besides, our current study yields a qualitatively robust result, regardless of
the statistical method used to analyze the best available data: Tradeable permits
dominate the tax in promoting the adoption of advanced abatement technologies.
Thus, our findings stand in direct opposition to the traditional theoretical result
according to which the tax is superior with regard to enhancing dynamic efficiency.
Abatement cost uncertainties, transition effects in adapting to policy implemen-
tation, and a differing perception of instrument stringency might explain why we
observe significantly higher investment expenditures in abatement technologies for
firms under a system of tradeable permits.
.
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III.A Appendix
III.A.1 Variables Used in the Empirical Analysis
Table III.5: List of variables.
Variable Label
Investhist Intensity of abatement technology investments prior to climate policy
implementation in 2008, i.e. investment expenditures prior to 2008 [Swiss
francs] divided by sales in 2008 [Swiss francs]
lnInvesthist Natural logarithm of intensity of abatement technology investments prior to
climate policy implementation in 2008, i.e. investment expenditures prior to
2008 [Swiss francs] divided by sales in 2008 [million Swiss francs]
Invest08 Intensity of abatement technology investments in the first year of climate
policy implementation (2008), i.e. investment expenditures in 2008 [Swiss
francs] divided by sales in 2008 [Swiss francs]
lnInvest08 Natural logarithm of intensity of abatement technology investments in the
first year of climate policy implementation (2008), i.e. investment
expenditures in 2008 [Swiss francs] divided by sales in 2008 [million Swiss
francs]
Investfut Intensity of abatement technology investments in 2009 and 2010, i.e.
investment expenditures in 2009/2010 [Swiss francs] divided by sales in 2008
[Swiss francs]
Regime Dummy variable indicating a firm’s instrument choice, i.e. the regulatory
regime to which it is affiliated (1=emissions trading, 0=tax)
Abate_low Dummy variable indicating low overall abatement in 2008 (less than 5 %) –
reference dummy
Abate_mod Dummy variable indicating moderate overall abatement in 2008 (5 – 19 %)
Abate_high Dummy variable indicating high overall abatement in 2008 (20 % or more)
Emissions Carbon emissions intensity (i.e. CO2 emissions in 2008 [tonnes of CO2]
divided by sales in 2008 [million Swiss francs]) as a proxy for potential permit
allocation
Wages Wage intensity (i.e. gross wages in 2008 [Swiss francs] divided by sales in
2008 [Swiss francs]) to indicate the potential refund of tax receipts
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III.A.2 Firms’ Choices and Econometric Models
Sample
Tax Regime
Permits Regime
Abatement technology investment > 0
Abatement technology investment = 0
Abatement technology investment > 0
Abatement technology investment = 0
Probit Tobit
Figure III.3: Firms’ choices and econometric models.
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III.A.3 Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the Multi-
variate Analysis
Table III.6: Summary statistics for the Tobit model in levels and logs and for the
Probit model.
Obs. Mean Med. Std.Dev. Min Max
y1 = Invest08
Invest08 84 0.0058 0 0.0195 0 0.1481
Regime 84 0.3452 0 0.4783 0 1
Investhist 84 0.0146 0.0018 0.0276 0 0.1111
Abatemod 84 0.3452 0 0.4783 0 1
Abatehigh 84 0.2857 0 0.4545 0 1
lny1 = lnInvest08
lnInvest08 84 3.7548 0 4.1600 0 11.9060
Regime 84 0.3452 0 0.4783 0 1
lnInvesthist 84 5.3505 7.4825 4.7054 0 11.6183
Abatemod 84 0.3452 0 0.4783 0 1
Abatehigh 84 0.2857 0 0.4545 0 1
y2 = Regime
Regime 72 0.4167 0 0.4965 0 1
Emissions 72 33.6314 8.2227 56.0712 0.0148 287.6916
Wages 72 0.2399 0.2094 0.1274 0.0079 0.7295
Abatemod 72 0.4167 0 0.4965 0 1
Abatehigh 72 0.3056 0 0.4639 0 1
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III.A.4 Multivariate Analysis in Logs
Table III.7: Estimation results for the intensity of investments in CO2 abatement
technologies with the investment intensities modeled in logs.
OLS Probit Tobit STP
Regime 3.2763∗∗∗ 4.0887∗∗∗ 5.1808∗∗∗
(4.3336) (3.1591) (3.0273)
lnInvesthist 0.2932∗∗∗ 0.5533∗∗∗ 0.5116∗∗∗
(3.8523) (3.5746) (3.2416)
Abatemod 1.4672∗ 4.9848∗∗ 4.7007∗∗
(1.7351) (2.6139) (2.4547)
Abatehigh 2.4849∗∗∗ 6.6406∗∗∗ 6.3454∗∗∗
(2.7284) (3.3796) (3.2214)
Constant −0.1615 −7.2016∗∗∗ −7.2142∗∗∗
(−0.3200) (−4.0456) (−4.0417)
Emissions 0.0678∗∗∗ 0.0645∗∗∗
(3.5957) (3.3894)
Wages −15.5659∗∗∗ −15.1677∗∗∗
(−2.9279) (−2.9156)
Abatemod 2.5613∗∗ 2.5822∗∗
(2.3543) (2.4920)
Abatehigh 2.9185∗∗ 2.8942∗∗∗
(2.5048) (2.6043)
Constant −0.8561 −0.8457
(−0.6979) (−0.7383)
σ 4.3156∗∗∗ 4.3515∗∗∗
ρ −0.3731
N 84 72 84 88
N cens. 44 44
N uncens. 40 40
R2 0.6059
Adj. R2 0.5860
Pseudo R2 0.6312
R2MZ 0.6659 0.6717
t or z statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table III.7 shows the results of the multivariate analysis with the log-transformed
investment intensities analogue to the level results in Table III.3. Significance values
and model fit considerably improved compared to level regressions. Furthermore,
the coefficients exhibit the same directions as for the Tobit and the STP estima-
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tions in levels. However, we cannot provide statistical evidence with respect to our
assumption of correlated error terms between the Tobit and the Probit equation.
Models using the log-transformation of the dependent variable raise retransforma-
tion concerns, since the values of the predicted mean and the marginal effects are not
simply obtained by taking their exponential (exp(E (ln y)) 6= E (y); Cameron and
Trivedi, 2009). Retransformation requires an adjustment factor that is dependent on
the estimated variance. Cameron and Trivedi (2009) emphasize the high sensitivity
of the retransformed results on estimates of σ that are biased when errors are non-
normal and heteroskedastic. According to the results of a Lagrange multiplier test,
the normality and homoskedasticity assumptions are violated even for the models in
logs. As a consequence, retransformation leads to exorbitantly high and unrealistic
mean values of our dependent variable. Therefore, we abstain from reporting any
marginal effects for the log-models.
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